Monographs in Aerospace History Series No. 11. Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station by Logsdon, John M.
Ne
--, 
OA4
61 
^%
0	 1^ t
The Origins of International
Participation in the Space Station
John M. Logsdon
A&
in Aerospace History #I I
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990041803 2020-06-18T00:59:26+00:00Z
The Origins of International
Participation in the Space Station
John M. Logsdon
NASA History Division
Office of Policy and Plans
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546
Monographs in Aerospace History # 11
November 1998
FROM VIRTUALLY THE BEGINNING of the twentieth
century, those interested in the human exploration
of space have viewed as central to that endeavor
the building of an Earth-orbital space station that
would serve as the jumping-off point to the Moon
and the planets. Always, space exploration sup-
porters believed, a permanently occupied space
station was a necessary outpost in the new frontier
of space. The more technically minded recognized
that once humans had achieved Earth orbit about
250 miles above the surface—the presumed loca-
tion of any space station—the vast majority of the
atmosphere and the gravity well would have been
conquered, and then human beings were about
halfway to anywhere they might want to go.
Space station advocates also recognized that the
scientific and technological challenge of building
an Earth-orbital space station was daunting and
that pooling the resources of many of the spacefar-
ing nations of the world would maximize the prob-
abilities of success. Thus, when the space station
project was born in the mid-1980s, it almost
immediately became an international program.
This monograph describes the very early process of
conceptualizing the international partnership and
crafting its contours during the period between
1984 and 1988.
This study was completed by John M. Logsdon
of George Washington University in late 1991, but
it was not published in a form suitable for wide cir-
culation. With the incorporation of the Russian
Federation into the space station partnership, it
occurred to Dr. Logsdon that a full account of the
origins of international involvement in the space
station program might be of interest to many
people, particularly as the initial launches of space
station elements draw near and the process of
assembling and then beginning to use the
International Space Station is imminent.
Logsdon has made revisions to the text as it stood
in 1991, adding a short concluding analysis that
brings the study to the present, inserting recent publi-
cations into the footnotes, and fixing a few grammat-
ical or linguistic infelicities. It seemed especially
appropriate to recognize briefly that the partnership
begun in 1984 and described in this account had
been augmented by the 1993 invitation to Russia
from the original partners to join them in the station
enterprise, but other than that Logsdon let the study
stand.
This is not the full story of the international part-
nership that has worked to build the International
Space Station. Indeed, such a history would
require much additional research. Nor does it con-
tain any significant detail on the Russian partner-
ship. Only the passage of time coupled with
thoughtful reflection will make such a history pos-
sible. We are presently working toward a full-
fledged history of the international partnership.
This is the eleventh in a series of monographs
prepared under the auspices of the NASA History
Division. The Monographs in Aerospace History
series is designed to make available a wide variety
of investigations relative to the history of aeronau-
tics and space. These publications are intended to
be tightly focused in terms of subject, relatively
short in length, and reproduced in an inexpensive
format to allow timely and broad dissemination to
researchers in aerospace history. Suggestions for
additional publications in the Monographs in
Aerospace History series are welcome.
Roger D. Launius
NASA Chief Historian
September 15, 1998
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................... ..............................1
Origins of the U.S. Invitation to Cooperate ............... ..............................3
Background................................................................3
Laying the Foundation for International Cooperation ...................................6
Space Station Task Force and International Cooperation ................................9
The Allies Are Interested	 ......................................................10
Mission Requirements Studies 	 ..................................................11
Making the Space Station International .................. .............................15
Resistance to International Involvement Surfaces .....................................15
The Space Station Decision Process and International Cooperation .......................1 7
Adding the International Element ................................................19
Extending the Invitation	 .......................................................20
The Partners Accept the Invitation ..................................................25
Introduction...............................................................25
Early Agreement Sought .......................................................25
Europe Charts Its Future in Space ................................................28
ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option ....................................28
Developing Political Support for Station Cooperation ..............................31
ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station Cooperation .......................34
Japan Determined Not to "Miss the Boat" ..........................................36
Canada Sets Its Space Priorities .................................................39
Conclusion................................................................43
Notes ........................................................................45
iii
Monographs in Aerospace History
Page intentionally left blank 
THIS STUDY TOOK a long time to complete, for a
variety of justifiable and not so reasons. Along the
way, the number of people who have helped has
become very large, and I am sure that I will fail to
give due credit and thanks to all who deserve it.
The study was carried out under contract to the
NASA History Division, using funds provided by
the Office of Space Station. Robert Freitag and
Terence Finn, of the latter office, recognized the
historical significance of the space station program
and were willing to support outside, independent
scholars to track the evolution of the program in
near to real time. They also supported the creation
of a Space Station Historical Archive; its manager,
Adam Gruen, and his assistants did a superlative
job of assembling documents and other materials
from the early days of the program, from which I
have drawn extensively in preparing this study.
Freitag and Finn also read several drafts of the
study and provided their on-the-spot perspectives
on how events unfolded. Overseeing the space sta-
tion historical effort and this study until she moved
to the Administrator's office was NASA Historian
Sylvia Fries, who provided gentle but firm guid-
ance and insightful comments on early drafts of the
study. Roger Launius was Sylvia's successor as
Director of the History Division, and he was
understanding as I pushed to finish the study.
Of the many others within NASA who helped
me locate documents, provided essential correc-
tive comments as I went along, and encouraged
me to get the job done, I owe particular thanks to
Peggy Finarelli. She trusted me enough to provide
access to material not often available to an outside
scholar, and then worked with me to make sure
that I had not inadvertently violated her trust. Dick
Barnes provided extensive insights and comments
and, with Peggy, was instrumental in opening
NASA files for my use. Al Condes worked with me
on document access, and Lyn Wigbels and Ken
Pedersen read the manuscript and provided help-
ful comments.
Individuals from U.S. station partners who went
out of their way to be helpful include George van
Reeth, Ian Pryke, Gabriel Lafferanderie, and Jean
Arets of the European Space Agency; Mac Evans,
Karl Doetsch, and Bill Cockburn of Canada; and
Masanori Nagatomo, Shinichi Nakayama, and
Yasahiro Kawasaki of Japan. Of course, the study
would not have been possible without the willing-
ness of many in the United States and overseas to
take time for an interview.
At George Washington University, Henry
Hitchcock provided valuable research assistance as
he pushed to complete his own dissertation on the
space station project. Lois Berdaus and Paul
McDonnell typed early drafts of the study until I final-
ly learned to use a word processor (and spell check!).
Underpinning this whole effort is an attitude with-
in NASA that what the agency does is of lasting sig-
nificance, is paid for by public funds, and should be
open for scrutiny by outsiders such as me. Colleagues
from abroad are amazed at the openness and acces-
sibility of U.S. government officials and the willing-
ness of government agencies to open all but their
most sensitive files to external examination, if the pur-
pose for doing so is valid. NASA has been a model
within the government in this respect, at least as far as
my experience is concerned.
When I prepared the manuscript for publication in
this monograph series, Kerry Murray, a graduate
research assistant at the Space Policy Institute, mas-
tered the modern technology of a scanner so that
there was no need to retype major portions of the
manuscript, and she otherwise was of great assistance
in getting the document ready for publication. She
has my thanks.
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I am grateful for the assistance offered by all
those mentioned above and by others who
contributed to this study. It goes without saying
that I alone am responsible for all errors of fact and
interpretation in this work and that the conclusions
and findings are mine and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration or George Washington
University.
The time when the space station experiment in
international cooperation can be tested in practice
is fast approaching. It certainly has been a long
time in coming!
John M. Logsdon
March 1998
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ON JANUARY 25, 1984, in his annual State of the
Union address to a joint session of Congress,
President Ronald Reagan announced that "tonight,
I am directing NASA to develop a permanently
manned space station and to do it within the
decade." A few moments later, he added: "We want
our friends to help us meet these challenges and
share in their benefits. NASA will invite other coun-
tries to participate so we can strengthen peace,
build prosperity, and expand freedom for all who
share our goals."' Just over a year later, during the
April–June 1985 period, Canada, Japan, and
Europe accepted in principle the U.S. invitation to
participate in the space station program. Thus was
initiated the most extensive experiment in interna-
tional technical cooperation ever undertaken.
This essay is a history and analysis of the steps
leading to the origins of the space station partner-
ship between the United States and its closest
allies. It traces the process that led to the decision
to invite other countries to participate in the pro-
ject and their reasons for accepting that invitation.
Not covered in this account are the difficult nego-
tiations during the 1984-1988 period that led first
to an initial set of agreements that allowed the
prospective partners to work together during the
early stages of the space station program and then
to the final set of agreements creating the original
space station partnership. Also, the 1993 invitation
to the Russian Federation to join the original part-
ners is not discussed, nor are the subsequent nego-
tiations to revise the 1988 agreements.
International cooperation has been a hallmark
of the U.S. civilian space program since its incep-
tion. It is fair to view that program not only as one
pressing the frontiers of science and technology
but also as an extremely important tool of U.S. pro-
paganda; the cooperative aspects of the program
were an important part of its propaganda aspects.
The term propaganda has a somewhat negative
connotation, but properly interpreted it means an
attempt to project—to propagate—a positive mes-
sage. The message sent to the world by the will-
ingness of the United States to share the explo-
ration of space with others is that of an open,
dynamic, pioneering society, eager to share its
capabilities and achievements with others. When
that message was supplemented by the demonstra-
tion of technological and organizational skill that
was Project Apollo, the space program clearly was
a powerful means of validating the U.S. claim to
world leadership.
Using the space program as an instrument of U.S.
foreign policy was relatively easy when only the
United States and the Soviet Union possessed the
capability to put humans and their machines into
orbit and beyond, particularly when the Soviet
Union had a space program characterized by secre-
cy and by limited contact with countries other than
its socialist allies. In the aftermath of the initial lunar
landing, however, the United States recognized that
other countries were seeking their own means of
access to space and that the Cold War competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union
might be replaced by an era of detente. Faced with
these emerging realities, during the 1969-1972 peri-
od, the United States consciously changed its
approach to space cooperation from one that
stressed data exchange, working together on scien-
tific projects and providing launch services for the
scientific satellites of other countries, to one that
involved direct foreign participation in the human
spaceflight program.
For the Soviet Union, this meant the highly sym-
bolic Apollo-Soyuz Test Project that led to a 1975
"handshake in space." For traditional U.S. allies
around the world, this meant an invitation to coop-
erate with the United States in the development of
post-Apollo systems for human spaceflight. , For rea-
sons described in detail in Chapter 2, this invitation
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resulted in Canada developing an essential hard-
ware element for the Space Shuttle—the Remote
Manipulator System—and Europe building a labo-
ratory for use in the Shuttle's payload bay-
Spacelab. These cooperative engagements were
very different in character from any that had taken
place before. They raised concerns about whether
Europe and Canada had the technological capabil-
ities to build sophisticated, highly reliable
"human-rated" hardware, or whether the United
States would have to provide them access to sensi-
tive or proprietary technology for them to be suc-
cessful in their projects. A contrary concern was
whether the U.S. invitation would stimulate its
partners to develop indigenous technological
capabilities that then would be competitive with
those possessed by the United States. Clearly, this
was a form of cooperation qualitatively different
from that involving a foreign scientist participating
in an experiment flown aboard a U.S. spacecraft!
During the 1970s, both the United States and its
partners went through a sometimes difficult period of
learning to work together in developing new hard-
ware for use by humans in space. The United States
still was by far the dominant partner in the post-
Apollo cooperative relationship. It was the United
States that established the basic design of what would
be developed and, more or less on a "take it or leave
it" basis, told its potential partners what an acceptable
contribution might be. As their confidence in their
own capabilities increased during the 1970s, largely
as the result of their success in the post-Apollo
coopera-tion, this attitude was becoming unaccept-
able to Europe and Canada. If they were to be
involved with the United States in future expensive
and challenging hardware development projects, it
would have to be on a more equitable basis.
This then was the context in which the United
States took the initiative as the 1980s began to discuss
with Europe, Canada, and Japan (which had not been
able to participate in the post-Apollo program) possi-
ble cooperation in the "next logical step" in the
development of space—the creation of a human out-
post in Earth orbit, a space station. Once again, a
major space undertaking was being put forth as a tool
of U.S. policy—a policy that for more than two
decades had used the space program to demonstrate
what was best about American society. As the fol-
lowing pages suggest, embodying that objective and
the recognition of U.S. leadership that accompanies it
in a stable, harmonious space station partnership has
proven no easy task.
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Background
WHILE THE HIGHLY VISIBLE personal endorsement by
President Reagan of foreign participation in the U.S.
space station program may have come as a surprise
to many in the United States and in potentially col-
laborating countries, the notion that the United States
would welcome some form of international coopera-
tion in the program certainly was not unexpected.
During 1982 and 1983, as NASA had tried to lay the
basis within the U.S. government for approval of its
space station proposal, possible international involve-
ment had been a subject of extensive discussion both
within the United States and between the United
States and its potential partners. That discussion itself
built on a record of cooperation that extended back
to the early years of the U.S. civilian space program
in the late 1950s.'
The 1958 Space Act had set as one of NASA's
objectives "cooperation by the United States with
other nations and groups of nations."' NASA's coop-
erative activities were limited primarily to space sci-
ence programs during the 1950s and 1960s, but as a
post-Apollo program was being planned during the
1969-1971 period, there was a decision to broaden
the basis of cooperation to include involvement in the
development of hardware, particularly systems relat-
ed to the human spaceflight program.'
NASA asked Europe, Canada, and Japan in late
1969 to consider ways of participating in its pro-
posed post-Apollo program, which at that point was
centered on an orbiting space station and a totally
reusable launch vehicle called the Space Shuttle.
Japan was just initiating its own general-purpose
space agency (although it had had an active space
science program for a decade). It took Japan some
time to decide whether it wanted to respond to the
U.S. invitation, particularly because its own space
capabilities were at such an early stage of develop-
ment. By the time that a response to the U.S. invita-
tion was agreed on within Japan, the United States
had so changed the possibilities for international
participation that there was no basis for Japanese
involvement. Canada was eager to be involved.
Several years of discussions led to an agreement that
Canada would provide the Remote Manipulator
System for the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle had turned
out to be the only element of NASA's ambitious
post-Apollo plans for human spaceflight that was
approved by the Nixon administration.'
Negotiations between the United States and
Europe on post-Apollo cooperation proved con-
tentious and left many in Europe ultimately unsat-
isfied with the bargain struck! Once it had been
established, by 1971, that the Space Shuttle was
the only major NASA project for the 1970s likely to
receive funding, NASA and European space lead-
ers agreed that Europe would examine three
options for involvement in the Shuttle program:
Teaming between European and U.S. indus-
try to develop specific parts of the Shuttle
orbiter—for example, the tail and payload
bay doors
2. European development of an orbital transfer
vehicle, known as the "Tug," to move payloads
from the Shuttle payload bay to other orbits
3. A Research and Applications Module, also
called the "sortie can," to provide additional
pressurized and unpressurized volume within
the Shuttle payload bay for experimentation
During the 1971-1973 period, Europe spent
approximately $20 million on studies of these
alternatives; by 1972, Tug development had
emerged as the preferred European contribution.
As the European studies progressed, however,
the U.S. position with respect to the level and kind
of European participation it wanted crystallized.
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"NASA's View: The Next Logical Step"—In 1982, with the successful completion of the four Space Shuttle orbiter flight tests, NASA
began planning activity to define a possible space station. The station was viewed as the next logical step in space. It built on the
nation's past experience in space and provided, for the first time, the capability for permanent use of the space environment.
(NASA photo 83-H-368).
First, the Nixon administration's interest in cooperat-
ing was later interpreted by the White House as an
interest in European involvement in the use of space
rather than in joint engineering projects. Second,
NASA found that the European aerospace industry
lagged approximately five to ten years behind U.S.
industry. Therefore, NASA dropped the idea of joint
development of technology, speculating that the
United States might stand to lose more than it would
gain. Third, NASA also decided that it did not want to
depend on other countries for critical items on the
Space Shuttle so that the Shuttle could fly indepen-
dent of foreign activities. Fourth, NASA decided that,
for safety reasons, it did not want to fly a Tug using liq-
uid propellants, the only type Europe was studying.
Moreover, there was real concern that Europe did not
have all the technology to develop a Tug.
Furthermore, the Tug was to be used to lift national
security satellites to higher orbits, and the notion of
non-U.S. involvement with these highly classified
satellites was not welcome to the national security
community.
The U.S. government thus found itself in the posi-
tion of having to walk back from the European per-
ception of the cooperative possibilities in post-Apollo
activities that had been encouraged by the way the
United States and Europe had proceeded to define
that cooperation" By the time the U.S. position had
been clarified in 1972, all Europe was offered, more
or less on a "take it or leave it" basis, was the devel-
opment of the Research and Applications Module.
(The module was renamed Spacelab in 1973.)9
Some in Europe, particularly in France, were
skeptical of the wisdom of close collaboration with
the United States on expensive projects, preferring
to concentrate on developing European capabilities
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for independent action. However, other countries, led
by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, had
become eager to become involved in developing
hardware qualified for human spaceflight, thereby
gaining skills in systems engineering and quality con-
trol. After hard negotiations within Europe, a "pack-
age deal" was agreed to in which funds were made
available to develop a French-supported European
launch vehicle (Ariane), to participate in the U.S. post-
Apollo program through Spacelab development, and
to develop a maritime communications satellite of pri-
mary interest to the United Kingdom. As part of the
package deal, a new cooperative organization, the
European Space Agency (ESA), was created to pool
the technical and financial resources of European
countries and to manage Ariane and Spacelab devel-
opment and other cooperative projects.10
The U.S.-European agreement on the Spacelab
project became a source of tension between the
partners. At the time it was negotiated, NASA was
projecting fifty or more Space Shuttle flights a year,
at a cost per flight of less than $10 million; many
of these flights were expected to require Spacelab
use. Thus the thought was that about six sets of
Spacelab hardware would be needed. Europe
agreed in 1973 to develop the first Spacelab at its
own expense and then transfer ownership to
NASA; NASA agreed to purchase any additional
Spacelabs required, with a minimum of one such
purchase guaranteed.
By the time Spacelab was ready for use, its
development costs had risen to almost $1 billion,
rather than the approximately $250 million
This designer's conception shows some of the applications of an advanced Space Operations Center, which was studied by Boeing
Aerospace Company for NASA. This advanced version of the "spaceport" shows the Space Shuttle unloading some of the modules that
would comprise the system, including living and command control quarters; warehouses for food, water, and hydrazine; and service areas
containing batteries and other necessary supplies. Other areas of this advanced concept include hangars for spacecraft, solar panels to pro-
vide power for the station, and construction equipment to handle large structures. The large structure containing several antenna reflectors
is a communications platform that is about to be assembled to an Orbital Transfer Vehicle for a flight to a higher orbit in space.
(NASA photo 81-H-793).
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originally estimated. Projections of Space Shuttle
usage had dramatically shrunk, and the United
States decided to purchase only the one additional
Spacelab it was obligated to buy, at a cost of $128
million. Any chance for Europe to recoup some of
its development costs through Spacelab produc-
tion thus vanished. The agreement provided for
one joint U.S.-ESA Spacelab mission at no launch
cost to ESA. After that, ESA would have to pay
launch costs for any Spacelab missions it wanted
to undertake. By the early 1980s, the combined
costs of preparing the experiments for a Spacelab
mission and paying Shuttle launch fees exceeded
ESA's resources, and the agency was left in a posi-
tion of not being able to afford the use of the sys-
tem it had developed. (Germany undertook two
Spacelab missions of its own—one in October
1985 and the second in April 1993.)
The U.S.-European interaction in the post-
Apollo period has been described in some detail
because it provided much of the context for U.S.-
European discussions on potential space station
cooperation." In hindsight, some top European
space officials described themselves as "stupid" in
accepting the U.S. terms for involvement in its
post-Apollo program, attributing their weakness to
an early 1970s lack of confidence in European
capabilities and to a belief that only through
cooperation with the United States could those
capabilities be improved." Thus, according to this
analysis, Europe was willing to pursue cooperation
on almost any terms, no matter how one-sided. By
contrast, in the early 1980s, with the completion of
Spacelab and the successful development of the
Ariane booster, Europe approached possible space
station cooperation with a strong sense of its own
capabilities and a determination to accept only an
arrangement that recognized its position as a major
spacefaring actor.
It is clear that Europe received substantial bene-
fits from its post-Apollo cooperation with the
United States. In particular, Europe gained experi-
ence in the systems-level management of complex
space projects—an experience that was quickly
applied to other European projects such as Ariane.
The upgrading of Europe's management, technical,
and human systems know-how obtained from the
Spacelab experience was an important positive
factor as the United States assessed possible inter-
national participation in the space station program.
Another positive byproduct of the post-Apollo
cooperation between the United States and Europe
and between the United States and Canada was a
set of personal and organizational relationships
biased toward continued cooperation. Those who
had been most directly involved, by and large, found
the experience programmatically productive and per-
sonally rewarding. Also, Canada successfully com-
pleted its contribution to the Space Shuttle and in the
process earned the confidence of NASA engineers at
the Johnson Space Center, some of whom were skep-
tical about the wisdom of non-U.S. involvement in
America's human spaceflight efforts. Japan, forced to
sit on the sidelines during Shuttle development, was
determined not to be left out of the next major coop-
erative opportunity. As NASA began to explore the
possibility of international involvement in the space
station, there was a basis of positive experience and
expectations among potential partners from which to
proceed.
Laying the Foundation for International
Cooperation13
The proposal to make a space station the central
project in NASA's post-Apollo program had been
decisively rejected by the Nixon administration
during the 1969-1970 period. The concept that
some kind of crewed orbital facility was an essen-
tial element of any plan for extensive space devel-
opment did not die, however; during the 1970s,
NASA sponsored a number of advanced studies of
possible space station missions and configura-
tions. 14 By early 1981, as the new administration of
President Ronald Reagan took office, NASA's two
major human spaceflight centers—the Johnson
Space Center in Houston, Texas, and the Marshall
Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama—had
each developed a preferred space station concept.
The two concepts were very different in approach.
The Marshall station began with a modest, human-
tended platform that would gradually evolve into a
permanently occupied facility; its primary mission
was as a research laboratory. The Johnson concept
was a large facility primarily intended to support
space operations, such as in-orbit construction,
fueling of spacecraft, and the preparation for
human missions to the Moon and Mars. The two
centers were traditional rivals within the decentral-
ized NASA organization, and each was pushing
NASA Headquarters to adopt its own approach to
the agency's next major project.
Space Shuttle development was phasing down in
1981; the first flight of the Shuttle was scheduled for
April. If NASA was to maintain its identity as an engi-
neering organization responsible for developing large
and complex hardware systems, particularly for
human missions, it was clear that the agency needed
to get a new post-Shuttle project approved soon.
It was in this context that the Reagan adminis-
tration choices as NASA Administrator and Deputy
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Administrator, James Beggs and Hans Mark,
respectively, appeared before a Senate confirma-
tion hearing on June 17, 1981. Beggs had served
briefly in NASA in the late 1960s and then had
become under secretary of the Department of
Transportation; during the late 1970s, he had risen
to a senior position with General Dynamics, a
major aerospace corporation. Mark had been
director of NASA's Ames Research Center in the
early 1970s and had served as under secretary and
then secretary of the Air Force during the Carter
administration. Both were intimately familiar with
space policy and program issues. They had actual-
ly been selected for their NASA positions in mid-
March, and shortly thereafter Beggs had obtained
Mark's agreement that "we would try to persuade
the new administration to adopt the construction
of a permanently manned orbiting space station as
the next major goal in space." 15 Beggs and Mark
announced that intent to the senators at their con-
firmation hearing.
It would take some time to develop the case for
the space station and to convince Ronald Reagan
to approve the project. 16 Before they could con-
centrate on station advocacy, Beggs and Mark had
to bring the Space Shuttle into what could be char-
acterized as operational status. They also had to
fend off, as best they could, 1981 attempts by the
new director of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to make major cuts in NASA's exist-
ing budget." Thus, even though the two top NASA
officials had publicly strongly endorsed the station
as "the next logical step" in space, the station pro-
gram took some time to pick up momentum,
although early planning activities began almost
immediately. An initial Space Station Conference
was scheduled for November 1981 to inform indi-
viduals throughout NASA and the U.S. government
of NASA's thinking to date and to lay the basis for
the more intensive planning effort that all knew
was required.
From the start, the possibility of international
involvement in any station program that might be
proposed was part of that planning. As mentioned
earlier, a bias toward international involvement in its
activities had been part of the NASA culture since the
organization's inception. To those in charge of plan-
ning for the space station program, it was inconceiv-
able that the United States would go forward with a
major effort in space and not include some form of
international cooperation. Typical of those who held
this perspective was Robert Freitag, Deputy Director
of the Advanced Program Office in the Office of
Manned Space Flight, who had been one of the pri-
mary architects of NASA-European post-Apollo coop-
eration and saw international cooperation in the
space station, particularly with Europe, as a produc-
tive continuation of the relationship established dur-
ing the 1970s.
Kenneth Pedersen, the Director of NASA's Office
of International Affairs, was another advocate of inter-
national cooperation. Unlike Freitag, Pedersen was
not a long-time NASA employee; he had come to the
space agency in 1979 from his position as head of
policy analysis and evaluation at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. Pedersen's position, as the
policy-level advisor on international affairs to the
NASA Administrator and as NASA representative in
discussions of international space matters with the
White House and other executive branch agencies,
gave him and his staff a different perspective than that
held by people such as Freitag, who was working on
international programmatic and technical issues in
one of the line offices of the agency. While Freitag
and his associates were enthusiastic advocates of
cooperation within and outside NASA, Pedersen had
to take a more cautious approach. He was fully aware
of the skepticism about the benefit-risk ratio of large-
scale international technological interactions that was
widespread among key members of both the career
national security community and the new Reagan
administration.
If there was skepticism and even opposition
within the space agency about the value of inter-
national involvement in NASA's major programs, it
resided primarily in the field center people who
had to deal with the added managerial complexity
inevitably introduced by such involvement. While
many at the Marshall Space Flight Center who had
been involved with cooperation in the Spacelab
program were receptive to international involve-
ment in the space station, staff at the Johnson
Space Center tended to be more dubious about the
wisdom of intimate international partnerships.
When NASA convened the initial agencywide
workshop on space station planning in November
1981, international involvement was a prominent
agenda item, and the report of the workshop
noted that:
There appears to be substantial foreign interest in
NASA's future plans for its manned space
activities. In some cases, this interest derives
from existing contributions to NASA's Space
Transportation System (STS]. Extending this
cooperation by participating in a NASA space
station seems a logical step to some countries
and space agencies.
NASA can derive significant benefits from
international participation in its programs if they
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are properly structured and controlled. These
benefits may include economic cost sharing,
access to unique or otherwise valuable expertise,
and improvements in the linking of foreign
programs to STS utilization.
The subject of potential international
participation in a U.S. space station program
must be approached carefully and proceed under
clear assumptions and guidelines. A fundamental
ground rule should be that planning for a space
station will be conducted as if the entire project
is to be developed as a wholly U.S. effort.
Planning should proceed, however, on the basis
that it does not foreclose international
cooperation. Potential foreign participants should
be encouraged to fund and undertake parallel
studies of space station requirements and
concepts which could benefit NASA in its design
of the space station. Procedures should be
developed to facilitate controlled exchanges of
study results. All potential partners should be
clearly informed that such exchanges during
Phase A do not represent a commitment on the
part of NASA to foreign involvement in the actual
development of the station.1
These 1981 perspectives guided NASA's approach
to possible international involvement in the station
over the subsequent several years. Indeed, those
within NASA responsible for technical-level liaison
with Europe for some time had been discussing with
their European colleagues the possibility of a U.S.
space station program and of European involvement
in it." The approach articulated at the November
conference reflected those discussions.
Another agenda item at the workshop was poten-
tial Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in
the space station. The support of the national securi-
ty community had been essential to gaining White
House approval for the Space Shuttle, but a fair
degree of tension in the NASA-DOD relationship had
risen in the decade since. However, the workshop
report noted that "the climate for initiating major new
NASA/DOD space endeavors is improving." The
report also recognized that "national security interests
may have considerable impact on the feasibility or
nature of international participation in a Space Station
program." 20 NASA hoped to find a way to reconcile
both DOD involvement and international participa-
tion, and thereby keep two influential
constituencies involved as it attempted to gain politi-
cal support for its plans.
Once a general approach to international involve-
ment in station planning had been developed, the
next step was to inform potential partners what it was.
For this purpose, NASA's international affairs chief
Kenneth Pedersen convened a meeting at the
Johnson Space Center on January 13, 1982. Pedersen
called this meeting on his own authority, although he
informed NASA Administrator Beggs that he was
doing so. Pedersen had been one of the first senior
NASA staff members to work closely with Beggs
after he had been selected to head NASA. Beggs
attended the Paris Air Show in June 1981 as NASA
Administrator-designate, and he and Pedersen met
with representatives of other countries to discuss
NASA's future. These meetings and frequent one-
on-one discussions made it clear to Pedersen that
Beggs was an internationalist in orientation and,
based on his experience with international cooper-
ation and co-production of the General Dynamics
F-16 fighter, understood the value to the United
States of involving allies in major U.S. programs.27
While there had been no formal decision by Beggs
to begin the process of soliciting international par-
ticipation in the space station, Pedersen in early
1982 felt on safe grounds in calling together repre-
sentatives of potential partners from Europe,
Canada, and Japan for a status report on space sta-
tion planning and a discussion of the approach
that NASA would take to assessing potential inter-
national involvement.
NASA's international partners during the preced-
ing two decades had been critical of the organiza-
tion for deciding by itself on the objectives and
design of projects and only then inviting foreign
involvement, on terms largely dictated by NASA.
Pedersen's major point at the January meeting was
that there would be a shift in NASA's approach;
potential partners were being invited to become
involved at a very early stage in program definition,
so that their inputs could help influence NASA's
choices and they could understand from the start
options for their participation. This approach, he
stressed, had risks as well as benefits. Pedersen told
the foreign representatives at this and subsequent
meetings: ITJhis is going to be for you an exciting
and a frustrating process: exciting because I think
you will see just how a program like this gets put
together from the nuts and bolts stage; frustrating
because you're going to suffer the stops and starts
and uncertainties that all programs like this go
through in the early stages."" As long as this situa-
tion was understood, said Pedersen, NASA was
eager, under the guidelines articulated at the
November 1981 meeting, to have its foreign coun-
terparts begin to study possible ways of becoming
involved as NASA's station plans took form.23
Not only its potential partners, but also NASA,
were taking some risks in this new approach. Since
its inception, NASA had structured its international
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cooperative programs under a set of guidelines that
provided the agency almost total control over the
character of those activities. Key to those guide-
lines were the notions of cooperative projects
being undertaken only when they were clearly of
mutual interest, no exchange of funds or unwar-
ranted transfer of technology, "clean" technologi-
cal interfaces, and NASA as overall project manag-
er. While these guidelines were not explicitly mod-
ified as station planning began in earnest, the very
fact of involving non-U.S. entities in that planning
implied that other changes in the NASA approach
to international cooperation were possible. To a
slight but perceptible degree, NASA was recogniz-
ing the need to share with others control over
shaping potential partnerships.
Space Station Task Force and International
Cooperation
In February 1982, NASA Associate Deputy
Administrator Philip Culbertson created an infor-
mal task force on the space station. This task force
was organized around a nucleus of people from
the Advanced Programs Office of the Office of
Manned Space Flight, in addition to several indi-
viduals from elsewhere in NASA. Administrator
Beggs on May 20, 1982, formalized the existence
of the Space Station Task Force. A major purpose
for creating the task force was to make space sta-
tion planning an agencywide process operating in
direct contact with NASA's most senior manage-
ment, thereby both minimizing the Marshall-
Johnson rivalry that had previously pervaded the
planning process and involving other NASA cen-
ters in defining the organization's next major pro-
ject. Named to head the task force was John
Hodge, a British-born veteran of the Mercury,
Gemini, and Apollo programs who had spent the
previous decade working for the Department of
Transportation. Hodge had been working with the
informal task force members since he had returned
to NASA; he had already indicated that he was a
strong proponent of international cooperation in
the station program.
While the task force had the responsibility for
planning the programmatic aspects of the space
station, NASA's Office of International Affairs was
in charge of developing the policies to guide dis-
cussions of international participation in the pro-
gram. A May 25, 1982, briefing for NASA
Headquarters officials captured the state of think-
ing on international involvement in the space sta-
tion. Pedersen identified four "key questions to be
answered":
• Can such a major project as a space station
be undertaken on an international basis and
still be effectively managed?
• Don't major international space projects just
result in technology leakage abroad?
• Is international involvement consistent with pos-
sible U.S. military utilization of the space station?
• What are the quids pro quo for foreign con-
tributions to a space station?"
This 1982 artist's conception depicts a
mature space station configuration, which
includes two solar panels to provide
power; several modules for command,
habitation, and experimental activity; a
Shuttle-sized unpressurized rack for the
storage of payloads; advanced remote
manipulator systems for the assembly of
large structures and the servicing/storage
of satellites and instruments; and a dock-
ing/utility hub that might serve in addition
as a "safe haven" in case of emergency.
Attached to the station in this picture is a
Shuttle orbiter. (NASA photo 82-H-869).
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During the early days of task force operations,
Hodge created a number of informal working
groups. Most addressed technical issues, but two
had as their focus more programmatic concerns.
One was a "Program Planning Working Group"
and was chaired by Robert Freitag. The other was
the "International Cooperation Working Group." It
also was initially chaired by Freitag, but was soon
taken over by Robert Lottmann, although Freitag
stayed closely involved. These working groups had
as members not only individuals from the task
force, but also people from other offices at NASA
Headquarters and from various field centers.
Throughout the period covered in this study, the
International Cooperation Working Group brought
together people at the working levels of NASA to
discuss international cooperation issues.
Freitag and Lottmann used the working groups as
tools for articulating the benefits of cooperation to
working-level skeptics throughout the agency. They
stressed that the additional financial contribution
from potential partners would enhance the scope of
the station and that the possibility of international
cooperation would increase support for the program
overall in the administration and Congress. They also
argued that learning to work together on long-term
complex projects could form the basis for coopera-
tion on even more ambitious programs in the future.
A series of interactions with potential partners
during May and June 1982 had emphasized to
John Hodge the high international interest in sta-
tion involvement. In a July 30 memorandum to
Kenneth Pedersen, Hodge noted that "internation-
al interest in our space station planning activity is
now relatively high. Recent actions by ESA,
Canada, and Japan suggest that this interest will be
pursued...." Hodge laid out a series of questions
that had to be addressed to develop a task force
approach to international cooperation, and he
asked Pedersen for his ideas on them .25
Pedersen's response was a fourteen-page, sin-
gle-spaced strategy memorandum. In it, he high-
lighted many of the issues that NASA would have
to address in crafting its approach to space station
cooperation. Among them were:
When to Involve Other U.S. Government
Agencies Interested in International Affairs.
Pedersen noted that "NASA is responsible
for making sure that all U.S. Government
agencies or portion thereof that have foreign
policy responsibilities are kept informed of
activities." In carrying out this responsibility,
reported Pedersen, NASA was already keep-
ing relevant State Department and
Department of Defense offices informed, and
had begun to brief the export control com-
munity on NASA's planning. He noted that
"other agencies such as [the Office of
Science and Technology Policy], OMB,
DOD, NSC [the National Security Council],
and ACDA [the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency] are probably interest-
ed in the international aspects as well as the
programmatic ones," and he suggested that
the Space Station Task Force include those
aspects in its briefings to these organizations.
Foreign Reaction to Military Involvement.
Pedersen noted that "this is an important
issue, since the interest and debate over the
militarization of space is at an all-time
high." He thought that it was important for
NASA "to be fairly straight forward at all
times on the probability and level of DOD
involvement expected. . . . We should be
working to accommodate both civil and mil-
itary uses within the basic design of the
space station, so that one does not make the
other impossible."
3. Technology Transfer. Pedersen noted that
historically NASA's cooperative programs
had been structured carefully to avoid
unwarranted technology transfer, particular-
ly by avoiding relationships between U.S.
and foreign industry that could lead to such
transfers. He thought that "if we carefully
choose the cooperative arrangements—for
example, we might make sure that they are
discrete hardware pieces with minimal
interfaces—we can minimize the potential
for technology transfer. " 26 But Pedersen also
noted "growing interest" in the Reagan
administration in the topic of technology
transfer." He saw "evidence of closer appli-
cation of existing export guidelines and
review of appropriate future steps in stanch-
ing the flow of advanced technology," and
he recognized the need for NASA to "main-
tain close and continuing contacts with the
export control community. "28
Pedersen also noted in his memorandum that
foreign involvement in the station program would
be certain to broaden the project's base of support
within both the administration and Congress.
The Allies Are Interested
Even before the formal kickoff of the Space
Station Task Force's international activities at a
September 13, 1982, "International Orientation
Monographs in Aerospace History
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station	 11
These briefing slides show the space station program elements and the complex as envisioned for 7990. (NASA photo).
Briefing," a substantial amount of non-U.S. plan-
ning related to the space station had begun. NASA
had adopted a strategy for its own planning efforts
of not preparing any particular station design until
both the missions such a station would carry out
and the capabilities needed to implement those
missions were identified.z° In January, Pedersen, in
response to foreign inquiries about how best to
proceed, had suggested to potential station part-
ners that they adopt a similar approach.
The response was not long in coming. On May 1,
1982, Japan announced its intent to establish a
Space Station Task Force reporting to the top-level
Space Activities Commission as its link to the NASA
station planning effort; that task force would involve
other Japanese organizations as well as the Japanese
National Space Development Agency (NASDA) in
putting together a plan for Japanese involvement in
the station." A mission requirement study was its
initial activity." Top-level endorsement of the
Japanese effort was provided during a June 1982
meeting in Washington between NASA
Administrator Beggs and Minister Nakagawa of
Japan's Science and Technology Agency.
On June 17, NASA Administrator Beggs met in
Paris with ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard.
Among the products of the meeting was an under-
standing that "ESA will fund, manage, and conduct
a first study entitled 'European Utilization Aspects
of a U.S. Manned Space Station.' This study will be
requirements-oriented."" Canada's National
Research Council also initiated a government-
industry study of possible Canadian missions that
could be carried out aboard a station, but it did not
get under way until several months later.
NASA was not totally successful in keeping for-
eign attention focused on station missions rather
than on station hardware. The June NASA-ESA
understanding noted that "ESA will fund, manage,
and conduct a second study with parallel
European contracts, to investigate the European
architectural and implementation implications of
those requirements identified in the first study,""
and Japan and Canada began to study potential
hardware contributions as well as mission require-
ments. In addition, both France and a German-
Italian team were studying, independent of ESA,
future hardware concepts for a European manned
program that could also form the basis for U.S.-
European cooperation. This was understandable,
noted Pedersen in his August strategy memoran-
dum to John Hodge, because of "'political reali-
ties'; they have to justify spending their resources
on a space station not only on potential space sta-
tion utilization but on potential industrial return as
well." Nevertheless, urged Pedersen, "we must not
let the emphasis on requirements get lost."'^
Mission Requirements Studies
In August 1982, NASA awarded eight contracts
to U.S. aerospace firms to conduct independent but
parallel requirements analysis studies. NASA's plan
was to combine the results of these eight studies
and those being carried out by potential partners to
help make the case that a station was justified.
Pedersen addressed the September 13
"International Orientation Briefing" at NASA
Headquarters both on NASA's general approach to
space station cooperation and its plans for interac-
tions during mission requirements studies. With
respect to the former, he noted that the general
principles that had guided NASA's international
activities in the past, appropriately modified,
would apply to the station situation. With respect
to the schedule for the mission analysis studies,
Pedersen noted that "the mid-term contractors'
summaries would be closed reviews. They will be
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conducted individually with each contractor
because NASA does not want the studies to conta-
minate one another." For this reason, he said, "the
reviews will be restricted to NASA personnel."
However, immediately following these reviews,
NASA would invite "foreign space agency repre-
sentatives" to hear a NASA summary of the U.S.
mid-term results and to present a mid-term status
report on their own studies. The final review of the
U.S. studies in February and March 1983 would be
open, said Pedersen, and he invited the foreign
study teams to attend and to present their final
results at the same time. Final written reports
would be exchanged among all study contractors,
U.S. and foreign, in April. In adopting this
approach, NASA was hoping to keep not only U.S.
but also foreign study teams isolated from each
other in the early stages of their efforts. In that way,
the thinking went, NASA and the sponsoring non-
U.S. space agencies would get the benefit of the
independent ideas of all contractors, rather than
have the various U.S. and non-U.S. study teams
unduly influence one another.35
Pedersen also announced that NASA would
welcome at any time visits of foreign space agency
representatives to NASA Headquarters (but not to
NASA field centers) to discuss space station plan-
ning. He characterized as "premature" any discus-
sion on potential foreign hardware contributions
and modes of cooperation beyond the Phase A
planning period.36
There were several reasons for NASA deciding to
deal only with representatives of foreign govern-
ments, and not individuals from non-U.S. industry.37
For one thing, it was industrial contacts that were
perceived as the most likely source of technology
transfer. Also, from the start of station planning,
NASA wanted to discourage the notion of interna-
tional teaming during the design and development
phases of the program. In the post-Apollo period,
U.S. and European industries had teamed to study
cooperative possibilities. While such transnational
industrial teams, with each firm funded by its own
government, ultimately did not emerge in the post-
Apollo period, NASA believed that this could have
limited its flexibility in structuring the post-Apollo
cooperation. While European contractors were
selected by ESA in large part to fulfill the requirement
that national contributions to ESA be returned to that
nation in approximately the same proportion, NASA
may not have wanted to select the U.S. partner of a
particular European firm as its contractor. The prohi-
bition against foreign visits to NASA centers, even by
government representatives, was intended to keep
NASA's possible partners from getting involved in
intercenter conflicts over station concepts and to
maintain Headquarters control over the internation-
al dimensions of the program.
Several aspects of NASA's posture at this time
were troubling to potential partners, particularly in
Europe. The principles for cooperation spelled out
by Pedersen seemed to reflect the same "NASA as
managing partner" approach that had been tradi-.
tional. Europe believed that its accomplishments
during the 1970s had earned it a larger voice in
future cooperative undertakings. The exclusion of
representatives of foreign industry from direct deal-
ings with NASA and the prohibition against visits
to field centers to discuss station planning were
annoying. NASA's European representative,
Richard Barnes, who was sensitive to foreign per-
ceptions, cabled a cautionary message to Pedersen
in early September 1982:
The history of the post-Apollo U.S./European
dialogue, as well as more recent experience,
suggests that there will be many occasions when
a NASA action, taken for legitimate internal
programmatic reasons, will be perceived by
some Europeans as "evidence" of NASA lack of
interest in European involvement. And of course
those who want to see European space programs
proceed in a direction independent of the U.S.
are already looking for such evidence. Let's give
them as little opportunity as possible.38
However, the undertone of skepticism in Europe
regarding NASA's seriousness about desiring signif-
icant space station cooperation was not pervasive,
nor did it extend to other potential U.S. partners.
During the rest of 1982 and early 1983, parallel
mission requirements studies went on in the
United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan. In addi-
tion, the general concept for the space station—
known as "distributed architecture"—emerging
from studies by NASA and its contractors was par-
ticularly congenial to international cooperation. In
this concept, the space station would not be a sin-
gle, large facility, but rather a complex of modules,
trusses, and platforms to carry out various space
station missions. This made it easier for a foreign
partner to contribute a separate space station ele-
ment that met the criterion of a "clean interface"
with other aspects of the station.
A major public symposium was held in mid-
1983 to review the status of space station plan-
ning. This symposium, organized by the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics for the
Space Station Task Force, brought together mem-
bers of the NASA planning groups, DOD, interest-
ed U.S. and foreign industrialists, the press, and
representatives from Congress and foreign space
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agencies. The main purpose of the symposium was
to get everyone interested in the station program
exposed to the most up-to-date information. In his
keynote address, Administrator Beggs noted that the
purpose of developing a space station "is, of course,
to maintain our leadership." But such leadership
would be through cooperation, he suggested, saying
that "the space station lends itself uniquely to
international cooperation. If we can attract that
international cooperation, then other nations will be
cooperating with us in the resources that they
spend, rather than competing with us. "39
Summarizing NASA's view of the international
dimensions of space station planning to date,
Kenneth Pedersen noted that:
[W]e all recognize that the very scope and
complexity of the space station process tends to
suggest that foreign participation, if it takes place,
is going to entail fairly sizeable financial and
political commitments on their part.... 1 believe
that when and if the time comes that we have
the opportunity to proceed "full steam ahead"
with the space station, they and their countries
are going to be in a better position as a result of
this [early involvement in NASA's planning]
activity to know what their interests are, to know
what their level of participation might be, and in
what areas that participation might be most
mutually beneficial.-
While his assessment of the status of interna-
tional involvement was positive, Pedersen also
added a caution. He noted that "NASA has been
aware throughout this space station study that we
do not have an approved program... . Thus we
have not wanted to create unnecessary and unwar-
ranted expectations that would come back to
haunt us.... We at NASA and the countries that
have been working with us have tried to be as
open and candid with one another as we could in
terms of the state of play, the current situation with
respect to the decision-making process, and what
we believed a realistic schedule would be.""
In mid-1983, this caveat was quite in order.
President Reagan in April had directed his top pol-
icy-making body for space, the Senior Interagency
Group (Space), to prepare over the summer a rec-
ommendation on whether he should approve the
space station program and include funding for it in
the fiscal year 1985 budget." NASA had found few
allies within the U.S. government in support of the
station; the interagency process was not producing
the hoped-for endorsement of the station. The
issue of potential international cooperation in a
space station was not being addressed at the top
levels of the U.S. government; the focus was on the
more fundamental policy issue of whether there
would be a space station program at all.
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Resistance to International Involvement
Surfaces
By mid -1983, it had become clear to those leading
NASA's effort to gain support for the space station
among other government agencies that the potential
for international involvement was not a strong selling
point. From the start, Pedersen and others had recog-
nized that the possibility of technology transfer associ-
ated with such involvement would be of concern to
the national security community and to administration
appointees at DOD. However, they were surprised to
discover that the individuals within the Department of
State overseeing the foreign policy aspects of science
and technology were not enthusiastic about the poten-
tial of international cooperation in the space station
program to serve broader, foreign policy objectives.
The technology transfer issue first surfaced in terms
of 1982 requests by U.S. firms carrying out the space
station mission requirements studies to exchange
information with their European counterparts.
Approval of these requests required the issuance of a
Technical Data Exchange Agreement under the pro-
visions of the Munitions Control Act, which was
administered by the Department of State. DOD was
also closely involved in the approval process.
To lay the basis for the anticipated approval of
these requests and to make sure that concerned
offices within DOD and the State Department were
aware of the overall context of planning for interna-
tional involvement in the space station program,
Robert Freitag briefed officials from DOD's Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering and the State Department's Office of
Oceans, Environment, and International Science and
Technology in mid -1982. The reception to the brief-
ings was reported to be "very good," at least in terms
of a willingness to listen to what NASA had to say.^'
However, approval for the data exchanges was not
forthcoming. NASA tried to push the process along in
late 1982 by appealing to higher level officials in the
State Department and DOD. Talking points prepared
for a meeting with DOD noted:
• There is no need to transfer any sensitive
technology at this point.... We are not
funding sensitive technology such as design
details, fabrication or procurement
information.
In the RFP [Request for Proposals for the
mission requirements studies], even though
we did not envision sensitive technology
transfer, we wanted to make it clear that the
NASA contract award did not constitute
approval for any technology transfer. We
stated in the RFP that U.S. companies must
follow normal export control procedures.
• ... We understand that several U.S. proposals to
exchange basic mission needs and general
systems information have not yet been approved
despite more than four months of review.
• Some concerns have been expressed within
DOD that consideration of these concerns
now is "premature":
- The U.S. has no commitment to a space
station program;
- The U.S. has no policy regarding
international involvement in a space
station program;
- Approval would be a "blank check" for
technology transfer."
NASA believed that the reason for DOD concern
was that there had been a change in the individuals
controlling the approval process. Apparently, the
export licenses had been recommended for
approval by the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Technology, Richard DeLauer, but that
recommendation had been rescinded as new
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At this meeting of the White House Cabinet Council of Commerce and Trade on December 1, 1983, approval of space station
development was the major agenda item. Key personnel in attendance are: Budget Director David Stockman (second from left),
Vice President George Bush (fourth from left), Science Advisor George Keyworth (center), President Ronald Reagan (second from
right), Secretary of Commerce Malcom Baldridge (third from right), Presidential Advisor Ed Meese (fourth from right), and Gil Rye of
the National Security Council (near door). (White House photo C18695-11).
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Richard
Perle and his deputy, Stephen Bryen, had been
successful in wresting export control responsibility
away from DeLauer. 45
 Both Perle and Bryen were
known as "hard-liners" on technology transfer;
having them involved in approving international
involvement in the space station did not bode
well.
On November 3, 1982, NASA appealed for help
to the Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance and Science and Technology, William
Schneider, making essentially the same points as
had been made to DOD. 46
 What the space agency
discovered in these and other interactions with the
State Department was that neither Schneider nor
the Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment,
and International Science and Technology, James
Malone, were supporters of the space station pro-
gram or of international cooperation in it, and they
shared Perle's and Bryen's concerns regarding
technology transfer."
Ultimately, DOD's reservations blocked the
issuance of export licenses. NASA wrote to the
eight mission requirements contractors on
December 14, noting that "consideration of these
cases within the export control community has
become an extended process—the principal con-
cern being that since a space station program has
not yet been given a new start, it would be prema-
ture to have any formal arrangements with foreign
industry." Given this situation, NASA suggested
that "in the short time remaining until the final
report is due in February 1983, we suggest that you
restrict your contacts with foreign sources to infor-
mation which does not require a license. "48
The recognition that plans for international
cooperation could be torpedoed by the opposition
of people such as Bryen, Schneider, and Malone
was sobering to the advocates of such cooperation,
and particularly to Kenneth Pedersen and his top
staff person on the space station, Margaret (Peggy)
Finarelli. Finarelli had joined NASA in 1981 after
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tours of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the
Carter administration's White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy. She was thus very
sensitive to the concerns of the national security com-
munity and their potential for posing an insuperable
barrier to NASA's plans. Her sensitivities were viewed
as excessive by long-time advocates of cooperation
within NASA, and this became a source of some ten-
sion between the Space Station Task Force and the
Office of International Affairs as the station decision
process unfolded in 1983.49
The April—December 1983 period was recog-
nized as critical by both advocates of the space
station overall and those who wanted the station to
be international. Recognizing that strong advocacy
of the latter could jeopardize getting approval to
go ahead with the station at all, during this period,
those heading NASA's interactions with the White
House and other agencies chose not to emphasize
the international potentials of the program. This
approach troubled some of the members of the
Space Station Task Force, but it was seen as a tac-
tical necessity by Beggs, Pedersen, and Finarelli."
The Space Station Decision Process and
International Cooperation
NASA's first attempt to gain President Reagan's
approval for the space station had come in mid-
1982. An interagency study of space policy, which
began in late 1981 under the leadership of the
White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, was nearing completion, and Ronald
Reagan was being asked to approve a new state-
ment of national space policy. In addition, Reagan
had agreed to attend the landing of the fourth
Space Shuttle mission in California on July 4; this
would provide an occasion for a presidential state-
ment on space policy. In attempting to convince
the White House to announce station approval as
part of its new space policy on the occasion of the
Shuttle landing, NASA Administrator Beggs wrote
Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese in late May. His
case for the station stressed its use as both a labo-
ratory and an operations base. He noted the chal-
lenge to U.S. space leadership from Soviet,
European, and Japanese accomplishments. He
argued that a major new project was needed to
maintain the human spaceflight development skills
of NASA and its industrial partners. As a final argu-
ment, Beggs noted that "the space station could
also have major foreign policy advantages for the
U.S. Both the European Space Agency and the
Japanese are interested in participating in its devel-
opment and would contribute substantial funding
if they are given a significant role. "57
NASA's attempts to gain Reagan's endorsement
of the station at this early point were not success-
ful; his advisors thought such a decision was pre-
mature. Thus, Reagan's July 4 speech at the Shuttle
landing said only that "we must look aggressively
to the future by ... establishing a more permanent
presence in space."" The station per se was not
mentioned.
Perhaps the most important feature of the new
National Space Policy announced on July 4 was
the transfer of leadership responsibility for devel-
oping space policy within the Reagan administra-
tion from the Office of Science and Technology
Policy to the National Security Council. The poli-
cy directive established a Senior Interagency
Group (SIG) on Space, chaired by the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, "to pro-
vide a forum to all Federal agencies for their poli-
cy views, to review and advise on proposed
changes to national space policy, and to provide
for orderly and rapid referral of space policy issues
to the President for decisions as necessary."" The
space station became one of the early items on the
SIG (Space) agenda.
Responsible for space policy matters within the
National Security Council staff at this time was Gil
Rye, an Air Force colonel who had worked on
space issues within the Pentagon before being
detailed to the White House. While still at the
Pentagon, Rye had been the Air Force representa-
tive at the NASA space station planning workshop
in November 1981, and by 1982, he had become
personally convinced that it was in the U.S. nation-
al interest to develop a space station. This view
was at variance with the Air Force position, which
was very skeptical of the value of humans in space
and which was centered on making the NASA
Shuttle responsive to DOD requirements before
any major new NASA initiatives were begun.
Having Rye as an ally in the White House proved
invaluable to NASA during the 1982-1984 period,
both in getting Reagan's approval for the space sta-
tion and in making international participation a
major feature of the station initiative.
Following its inability to gain an early space
station endorsement by the White House, NASA
decided to wait until 1983 for its next attempt at
program approval. A dual strategy was devised.
NASA would work through the prescribed SIG
(Space) process to attempt to gain the support of
other government agencies for the station project,
while at the same time NASA's leadership would
try to reach the President Reagan and his top
advisors directly to convince them of the merits of
the undertaking. 54 Meanwhile, the Space Station
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Task Force would continue its programmatic liai-
son activities with potential partners, so that there
was a basis for collaborative action should a sta-
tion program with international involvement be
approved.
In support of this strategy, the task force formed
a unit called the Concept Development Group. Its
task was to integrate the results of field center stud-
ies, the eight industry studies of space station
requirements, and any input from potential inter-
national partners. The chair of the group was
Luther Powell of the Marshall Space Flight Center,
who had had extensive experience in cooperation
with Europe during the Spacelab program.
International representatives participated in the
activities of the Concept Development Group and
were involved in many of the studies of require-
ments and of systems and subsystems carried out
during 1982 and 1983.
In the fall of 1982, SIG (Space) formed a working
group on the space station. This group was chaired by
NASA's John Hodge, and it consisted of representa-
tives from the State Department, DOD, the
Department of Commerce, the CIA, and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. Individuals from
the Office of Management and Budget and the Office
of Science and Technology Policy participated as
observers. That group first met in October 1982, and
it laid out a schedule that called for a report to SIG
(Space) on policy options for the space station no
later than November 1983.55
It did not take long to discover that there was
substantial skepticism among some members of
the working group regarding the wisdom of inter-
national participation in the station; this skepticism
reflected the general attitudes of those at the poli-
cy level in DOD and the State Department. The
discussion at the group's second meeting on
November 22 turned to the issue of State
Department approval of exchanges of require-
ments data between U.S. and European firms car-
rying out mission analysis studies (as discussed
earlier). The State Department representative noted
that approval was being delayed even though
"there do not appear to be any objections to the
merits of the cases," but because "DOD has a con-
cern which it has not yet resolved regarding the
broad policy issue of whether there should be
international participation in a Space Station. "56
Most of the SIG (Space) working group's time
between October 1982 and April 1983 was spent in
developing the specific terms of reference for its
study. Once that agreement was reached, Rye decid-
ed to elevate the political pressure behind the study
request by having President Reagan, rather than the
chair of SIG (Space), sign the terms of reference.
The directive by Reagan that set the guidelines for
the formal SIG (Space) study of the space station,
signed on April 11, 1983, called out "the foreign
policy implications, including arms control implica-
tions, of a manned Space Station" as one of five pol-
icy issues for examination; international cooperation
was not explicitly mentioned." A few days earlier,
James Beggs had met with Reagan in a session
arranged by Rye. The purpose to alert President
Reagan of issues involved in the decision on whether
to develop a station. The briefing prepared for
Reagan noted that the space station "provides broad
opportunity for international cooperation," but this
was only one of seven benefits identified as flowing
from the station program.58
As the study process proceeded in the late
spring, it became clear that the Hodge interagency
group had become bogged down in technical
details and multiple options and was unlikely to
produce a policy paper suitable for SIG (Space)
consideration. Recognizing this, Gil Rye created a
smaller group to develop such a paper. 59 The NASA
member of the group was Peggy Finarelli. She con-
tinued the approach of downplaying the interna-
tional aspects of the program; her approach was
not totally appreciated by Hodge and others in the
Space Station Task Force, who also may have resent-
ed her taking over the NASA lead in White House
deliberations on the station. While Robert Freitag
may have been the most influential of the veteran
NASA staffers in pushing for making the space sta-
tion international and Kenneth Pedersen was the
conceptualizer of NASA's approach to station coop-
eration, Finarelli's tactical efforts over the May
1983—January 1984 period were crucial to creating
the domestic basis for the station partnership."
In August, the SIG (Space) process resulted in an
options paper for President Reagan on the station
program; however, the opponents of the program
would not agree to sending the paper forward for
presidential decision. Given Reagan's aversion to
addressing nonconsensus recommendations, this
effectively blocked a presidential decision. In par-
ticular, vigorous opposition by Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger made it clear that
DOD not only would not participate in the station,
but also would actively oppose allocating substan-
tial budget resources to a NASA station aimed at
civilian uses. The schedule for SIG deliberations
had been accelerated to reach a recommendation
in time for fiscal year 1985 budget submissions in
September, but after a meeting of SIG on August
12, it became evident that a positive recommen-
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dation to Reagan to proceed with the station was 	 opportunity to link a presidential invitation for inter-
not likely to emerge from the group.
	
	
national participation with the announcement of sta-
tion approval.
Given this situation, Rye decided to seek other
means of gaining presidential approval. During the
September—November 1983 period, NASA's assess-
ment of the prospects for gaining White House per-
mission to move ahead with its highest priority
project were very pessimistic, even through the
agency had included start-up funds for the project in
its fiscal year 1985 budget submission."
Ultimately, NASA's second approach to gaining
space station approval—convincing Reagan and his
advisors of the merits of the program—bore fruit. Still,
international considerations did not play a visible
role. President Reagan, through an October 4
National Security Council memorandum, requested
NASA to identify its priorities in meeting the goal of
space leadership that had been set in the 1982
National Space Policy statement. In his reply, James
Beggs said that he was "absolutely convinced that a
space station is the next bold step in space.... It is
an essential piece of our long range plan to reap the
full commercial and scientific benefits of space."
Nowhere in the response were the benefits of inter-
national cooperation mentioned .12
Reagan's decision to approve the space station was
finally made in early December. Wanting to involve a
broader range of agencies in the discussions than just
the members of SIG (Space), thereby outflanking sta-
tion opponents in that body, Rye and another station
supporter on the White House staff, Cabinet Secretary
Craig Fuller, scheduled a December 1 meeting of the
Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade to discuss
the station in Reagan's presence. The model of the
space station that NASA prepared for the meeting did
not show any foreign contributions to the project.
The meeting went well, and a few days later,
NASA learned that President Reagan had given his
blessing to the station. However, the issue of whether
the space station should be an international effort was
not addressed.
Adding the International Element
Although Reagan approved the space station in
early December, the question of how that approval
would be announced was not decided at that time.
Within a few weeks, however, White House political
advisors concluded that the station was the kind of
long-range initiative that fit into the Reagan's plans for
his State of the Union address scheduled for late
January. Suggestions on what he should say about the
station were solicited by the White House speech
writing office, and Rye, Finarelli, and others saw an
NASA was ready to seize that opportunity.
Pedersen and Hodge had met as long ago as July
1983 to identify the policy issues that had to be
addressed for NASA to proceed with international
participation, once presidential approval for the sta-
tion program was obtained. In a follow-up memo-
randum, Pedersen had noted the major issues:
1. What space station "components" are not
eligible for cooperation?
Discussion ... NASA still needs to decide
whether certain elements, while requiring a
clean interface, may still be elements which the
U.S. should build.
2. Foreign Involvement in Phase B
Discussion ... Should NASA undertake Phase
8's on all space station elements, while foreign
space agencies fund independent parallel Phase
B studies on space station elements in which
they have a particular interest? Should NASA
entertain Joint Phase B studies?... At what point
does NASA begin to drive individual countries to
particular ele-ments, or should we encourage
multiple approaches by all so that natural "fits"
fall out?
3. Guidelines for international participation
Discussion ... To what extent do we want to
establish de facto minimum contributions (either
in terms of funding or in elements)?
4. Study Agreements, MOUs, and Quids Pro Quo
Discussion ... Phase B study agreements would
be desirable from the viewpoint of our partners
and NASA for several reasons: a) they would
provide the framework for information exchange
and industry-to-industry relationships; and b)
they could strengthen foreign space agencies'
position ... for funding and support.
... One major element that must be reviewed
now are potential quids pro quo that NASA will
want to offer in exchange for hardware
contributions. NASA's experience with the [Space
Transportation System] program suggests some
very good examples that would be appropriate to
a space station: NASA commitment to buy
additional hardware, preferred access to the
space station on a variety of uses, reduced (or
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no) costs for utilization, and opportunities for
flight of foreign personnel. Of course, formulas
for these would have to be worked out so that
the benefits match the size of the contributions.
... In addition, I think NASA should consider
international cooperation on the operation of the
space station, as NASA and ESA have agreed to
do on the Space Telescope, and consider how
that should be factored into the equation.
5. Technology Transfer and DOD Concerns
Discussion ... Prior to Phase B, NASA needs to
develop a set of ground rules for both
Headquarters and the Centers on information
exchange with our foreign partners. These will
not only be useful for reference for NASA
employees, but will also demonstrate to the
export control community that NASA is aware of
the current technology transfer concerns, and
doing something about them .61
At some point in the fall of 1983, the foreign
policy potential of the space station had come to
the attention of individuals in the Office of the
Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Bureau
of European and Canadian Affairs of the State
Department. There was more receptivity to that
potential among these individuals than there had
been from the science and technology elements of
the State Department. As plans for announcing the
space station in the 1984 State of the Union
address moved forward, Finarelli at NASA and
State Department officials Thomas Niles and
Arnold Kanter were actively discussing the benefits
of station cooperation in the context of broader for-
eign policy concerns.
These discussions, and the recognition that the
issue of international cooperation had to be
addressed in some way before approval of the
space station program was announced by
President Reagan, led to a January 18 meeting con-
vened by the chair of SIG (Space), Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs Robert
McFarlane, and his deputy, Admiral John
Poindexter. Attending the meeting were NASA
Administrator James Beggs, Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleberger,
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle,
and CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates. This high-
level group not only decided to solicit internation-
al participation in the space station; they also
chose to have the invitation to participate come
from President Reagan as he announced his
approval of the station program in the State of the
Union address seven days later. The top-level
group decided that Beggs, acting as the Reagan's
personal emissary, would travel to key foreign cap-
itals to extend the presidential invitation in person.
The text of the invitation as it was to appear in the
State of the Union address was hurriedly drafted on
the evening of January 18 and approved by the
meeting participants the next day. There were no
interagency meetings or policy papers devoted to
the cooperative proposal, nor any formal assess-
ment of the risks associated with international
cooperation. This was a decision made by top pol-
icy officials, not a ratification of staff proposals.
The issue of international participation was not
separately raised with President Reagan; his
approval came in the form of overall approval of
the speech text.b^
Before he made the State of the Union speech,
Reagan sent a personal message to Chancellor
Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany,
President Francois Mitterrand of France, Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United
Kingdom, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi of Italy,
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, and
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada:
During my State of the Union address this
Wednesday, January 25, 1 will be announcing the
United States' intention to proceed with
development of a manned Space Station
program. It is my hope that we can work together
on this project. To develop this cooperative effort
/have asked James M. Beggs, the Administrator
of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), to act as my personal
emissary and meet with senior officials of your
government in the near future."
Thus when Ronald Reagan went before Congress on
January 25, 1984, and invited other countries to par-
ticipate in the space station project he had just
announced, that presidential invitation came as no sur-
prise to the leaders of those countries that the United
States hoped to engage in the station partnership.
Extending the Invitation
The first step in arranging the trip of Administrator
Beggs was to develop "terms of reference" to guide
him in his meetings. These guidelines were drafted by
NASA and circulated for comment by the National
Security Council to other agencies that were mem-
bers of SIG (Space). The staffs of those agencies,
which had been bypassed in the rapid process of
approving President Reagan's invitation, used this
opportunity to make sure that they would be
involved in preparing a "report on approaches to
international cooperation" for Reagan's approval
after the Beggs trip was completed .66
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The approved terms of reference for the Beggs trip
were issued by the President's Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane, who was
also chairman of SIG (Space). McFarlane wrote Beggs
on February 25, saying that "the President would like
for you to travel as soon as possible to appropriate
foreign capitals as his personal emissary and meet
with senior officials to discuss potential international
cooperation" in the space station, with the objective
being "to agree upon a framework for collaboration
on this program which could be announced at the
London Summit in June 1984."67 The idea of includ-
ing station cooperation as an agenda item on the
annual seven-nation economic summit had come
from Peggy Finarelli and Thomas Niles and had been
embraced by those within the State Department
responsible for summit planning .68
The terms of reference for the trip specified that in
his discussions with foreign officials, Beggs should:
Explain NASA's current plans for development
of a permanently manned space station, with
emphasis on expected capabilities, modular
design, anticipated availability, and relationship
with the President's overall civil and
commercial space program.
• Assess the extent of foreign interest in program
participation. The assessment should include the
level of overall interest, the expected benefits to
be achieved, and the foreign resource
contributions that might be forthcoming.
During the discussions with foreign officials,
the Administrator should avoid making specific
commitments regarding international
cooperation until other U.S. government
agencies have had the opportunity to review
the implications."
President Ronald Reagan announcing the decision to build a space station during the January 25, 1984, "State of the Union
Address," while Vice President George Bush and House Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill look on. (NASA photo).
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The original plans for the Beggs trip called for the
use of commercial airlines. Vice President George
Bush, who had offered quiet support for the interna-
tional initiative all along, suggested to the NASA
Administrator that he request the use of one of the Air
Force planes available to the White House; Bush indi-
cated that he would support such a request.'°
Accordingly, on February 19, Beggs wrote White
House Chief of Staff James Baker requesting the use
of a government airplane, arguing that it was "justi-
fied and appropriate" because of "the President's
direct instruction, the extremely tight timetable, and
the importance which space station has assumed
here and abroad as a central feature of this
Administration's leadership program.""
The plane was provided by the White House, and
Beggs and an entourage that included Gil Rye from
the National Security Council staff, Phil Culbertson,
John Hodge, Ken Pedersen, Peggy Finarelli, and Lyn
Wigbels from NASA, and Mark Platt and Michael
Michalik from the State Department left Washington
on March 3. They traveled to London, Bonn, Rome,
and Paris and flew directly from Paris to Tokyo,
returning to Washington on March 13. After a few
days home, the group visited Ottawa. At each stop,
Beggs formally reiterated Reagan's invitation to con-
sider participation in the U.S. space station program,
and he tried to respond to questions and concerns.
At every stop, Beggs and his group met with space
officials and with the highest ranking nonspace offi-
cials available, as follows:
• London—with the minister of state for industry
and information technology and the science
advisor (Prime Minister Thatcher and the for-
eign secretary were meeting outside of London
with French President Mitterrand)
• Bonn—with the minister for research and tech-
nology and the under secretary of the foreign
ministry (Prime Minister Kohl and the foreign
minister were in Washington)
• Rome—with Prime Minister Craxi, the sci-
ence minister, and the head of the National
Research Council.
• Paris—with President Mitterrand, the foreign
minister, and the minister of industry and
research (Beggs also met with ESA executives
and addressed a meeting of that agency's
political governing board, the ESA Council.)
• Tokyo—with Prime Minister Nakasone, the
foreign minister, and the minister for science
and technology (Beggs also spoke to the
Keidanren, the influential federation of
Japanese industries.)
• Ottawa—with the minister of state for science
and technology, the science advisor, and the
president of the National Research Council
One issue in every discussion was the size and cost
of the contribution for which NASA was hoping.
Beggs had asked Ken Pedersen in January for an esti-
mate of what a reasonable expectation might be.
Pedersen's response noted that Europe had con-
tributed approximately 12 percent of the costs of
developing the Space Transportation System and that
it was "reasonable to expect similar percentage con-
tributions from these countries to Space Station." He
noted that the German estimate for a potential space
station contribution was $1.5 billion and that Canada
was considering a station contribution that "would
cost roughly the same" as the $100 million Canada
had spent on the Space Shuttle remote manipulator
system. Pedersen thought that "it is probably not real-
istic" to expect Japan's contribution to be half that of
Europe, but he noted that the pressurized module that
Japan was considering "would cost Japan at least
$500 million to develop given their current lack of
related [research and development] experience. "72
Upon his return from Europe and Japan, Beggs
wrote to Secretary of State George Shultz on March
16, which summarized his assessment of the trip to
date. He told the Shultz that:
The reaction so far to the President's call for
international cooperation has been both strongly
positive and openly appreciative. It has been
positive in the sense that our principal Allies are
moving quickly, or have already moved, to take
political decisions to participate. And their
reactions clearly show appreciation for the major
foreign policy benefits that will flow from open
and collaborative cooperation on such a bold,
visible and imaginative project."
On the basis of the March trips, NASA judged
that Italy, Germany, and Japan had in essence
already made the political decision, at least in
principle, to participate and that France was also
likely, after tough bargaining, to be involved. The
reception in Great Britain had been the coolest on
the trip, and the uncertainty of an upcoming
national election made it impossible for Canada to
indicate its commitment to cooperation. It seemed
as if European cooperation would be organized
through ESA, rather than on the basis of bilateral
relationships between the United States and spe-
cific European countries."
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After his round of visits to foreign capitals was
over, James Beggs wrote a letter to each country he
had visited to summarize his understandings, clar-
ify issues that had been raised, and lay out the next
steps. He reiterated the basic U.S. position that:
President Reagan has committed the U.S. to
building an $88 fully functional space station to
be operational by the early 1990s, but has also set
the stage for working together to develop a more
expansive international space station with even
greater benefits and capabilities for all to use.
Thus, we are inviting your Government to take a
close look at our plans and concepts and then,
based on your long-term interests and goals, share
with us your ideas for cooperation that will
expand the capabilities of the space station .73
In person and in writing, the United States had
now extended an invitation for international partic-
ipation in the space station. Such cooperation had
been escalated from a possibility discussed among
space agencies to a highly visible initiative of the
U.S. president. In the months ahead, the United
States would discover whether a framework for
accepting that invitation could be developed.
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Introduction
In the first months of 1984, the hope of the
United States was that its invitation to participate
in the space station program would be quickly
accepted, at least in principle, by political leaders
in Europe, Japan, and Canada. It was also hoped
that detailed negotiations on the terms and condi-
tions of that participation could then commence,
leading to the signing of initial cooperative agree-
ments by the end of 1984. The terms of reference
for the trip of James Beggs directed him to seek
agreement on "a framework for collaboration" on
the space station, "which could be announced at
the London summit" in June 1984. 76 Such early
agreement was not feasible, however; it took until
the first months of 1985 for the political foundation
for the station partnership to be established. This
section describes the steps that led to European,
Japanese, and Canadian acceptance of the U.S.
invitation to consider engaging themselves with
the space station program.
Early Agreement Sought
The idea of including the station invitation as an
agenda item for the London Economic summit
arose out of conversations between NASA's Peggy
Finarelli and Thomas Niles of the State
Department's Bureau of European-Canadian
Affairs, after the basic decision to invite interna-
tional participation in the station had already been
taken. Niles remembers that:
Having seen this proposal, my colleagues and 1
in the State Department who were responsible
for the Department's participation in planning for
the Summit concluded that this was an
appropriate initiative. We based this conclusion
on the obvious need for initiatives in connection
with the Summit, the fact that the Summit
participants were the obvious choices to join
with us in the space station, and the reality that
kicking a proposal of the magnitude of the space
station up to the Head of State/Government level,
through the Summit process, is often the best
way to get a decision."
At a January 30 planning meeting for the
London Economic Summit, President Reagan
approved the notion of asking other summit partic-
ipants to issue a statement indicating their intent to
participate in the space station program. The head
of summit preparations in the United States was H.
Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs. He and his colleagues in the
other six summit countries were known as
"Sherpas." The Sherpas met on February 17-19; all
seemed open to the idea of having the summit
partners declare that they "agree in principle to
cooperate in the development of an international
space station, demonstrating that free nations will
continue to use outer space for peaceful purposes
and for the benefit of mankind.
The results of the NASA Administrator's rapid
trip, however, suggested that much work would
have to be done if any agreement were to be
reached in time for the summit. Beggs wrote Wallis
that he had come to understand during his trip
that: "the Summit declaration is . . . extremely
important to NASA's counterpart technical agen-
cies in these other countries. To them it represents
the political underpinnings necessary to proceed—
analogous to the President's State of the Union
guidance to us. 1179
In addition to time needed for each potential
partner to develop domestic political support for
participation in the space station program, two
issues of concern emerged at almost every stop on
the Beggs trip. While not insurmountable obstacles
to collaboration, they suggested that tough negoti-
ations would be required before final commitment
to international participation could be obtained.
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One was technology transfer. In his follow-up let-
ter to those he had met on his trip, Beggs recog-
nized that "technology transfer has been an
increasing concern on all our parts in the past few
years, and we will need to work together to make
sure we are protecting our mutual technology
bases in this partnership."80
 The other issue of gen-
eral concern was the extent of U.S. military
involvement in the space station. Here, the U.S.
position had been carefully crafted to reflect both
anticipated foreign sensitivities and to be accept-
able within the U.S. government. Beggs told poten-
tial partners that:
The U.S. space station program is a civil program
which will be funded entirely out of NASA's
budget, with no national security funds used....
The space station that the President directed
NASA to build is a civil space station. Of course,
like the shuttle, the space station will be
available to users. If there are any national
security users, like national and international
users, they will be able to use the facility. As
provided in the Outer Space Treaty, however, all
activity on the space station will be limited to
peaceful, nonaggressive functions.81
Beggs also reported that "our principal allies are
moving quickly, or have already moved, to take
political decisions to participate."82 This may have
overstated the situation somewhat. On one hand,
having the invitation to participate come from the
U.S. President and be extended to other heads of
government had changed the stakes. The preceding
two years of discussions at the technical level, and
the biases toward collaboration that had emerged
from those discussions, were transformed into an
issue high on the policy agenda. No ally wanted to
be in a position, without compelling reasons, to
refuse President Reagan's public invitation. On the
other hand, all three potential partners—Japan,
Canada, and Europe—were in the midst of their
own internal debates over the future direction of
their space efforts. Accepting the U.S. invitation,
even in principle, implied that a significant share of
their space budgets over the coming decade would
have to be channeled into a partnership with the
United States. Beggs had made it clear that the U.S.
desire was for significant contributions to the sta-
tion, roughly equivalent to 10 to 20 percent of the
partners' overall space budgets for the next decade.
Whatever their leanings toward accepting Ronald
Reagan's invitation, in few of the potential partners
had there yet been enough discussion to make their
leaders willing to make a firm political commitment
to collaboration of that character and scope.83
As a followup to the Beggs trip and in prepara-
tion for the summit, Gil Rye, Peggy Finarelli, and
Robert Freitag made an April trip to Europe, meet-
ing with both space agency officials and summit
Sherpas. Their discussions reinforced the sense
that some in Europe would be cautious about mak-
ing a commitment to cooperation at the summit.
They also found that the smaller member states of
ESA, which were not part of the summit process,
were concerned about a summit declaration that
could commit them to additional contributions to
ESA. There was limited enthusiasm for the station
proposal in some of these states, both because
their industries did not see the prospect for signifi-
cant business in the undertaking and because
finance ministries, almost always opposed to
increasing space budgets, had more influence than
space advocates in smaller ESA member countries.
The potential for international participation in
the U.S. space station was a "talking point" on
President Reagan's agenda for his private meetings
with each of the other six leaders at the London
Economic Summit, which took place June 7-9; the
issue was not discussed during the formal plenary
sessions of the summit leaders. However, as they
emerged from one of those meetings, the seven
leaders encountered a large model of the station
that (unlike the model that NASA had brought to
the White House the preceding December) includ-
ed representations of potential foreign contribu-
tions; this was a carefully staged opportunity for
President Reagan to discuss his invitation to partic-
ipate. NASA's Langley Research Center had pre-
pared the detailed station model, which the U.S.
summit delegation (including Gil Rye and Peggy
Finarelli) had carried to London; twenty to thirty
minutes of lively discussion and a "photo opportu-
nity" ensued as the summit leaders gathered
around the model.
The summit communique was cautious in its lan-
guage, saying (in its final substantive paragraph) that:
We believe that manned space stations are the
kind of programme that provides a stimulus for
technological development leading to
strengthened economies and improved quality of
life. Such stations are being launched in the
framework of national or international
programmes. In that context each of our
countries will consider carefully the generous
and thoughtful invitation received from the
President of the United States to participate in
the development of such a station by the United
States. We welcome the intention of the United
States to report at the next Summit on
international participation in their programme.84
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The London Economic Summit of June 7-9, 1984, during which the space station was a major topic of discussion. Leh to right:
President Reagan (United States), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom), Foreign Minister Graf von Lambsdorf
(Germany), and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan). (NASA photo).
While this statement was less of an endorsement
than had been proposed to the summit Sherpas in
February, the noncommittal language of the com-
munique accurately reflected the state of affairs in
June 1984.' Even so, it was an endorsement of the
station concept and thanked Ronald Reagan for his
invitation. The inclusion of station cooperation on
the agenda for the 1985 summit was particularly
significant. It was intended to encourage speedy
decision-making in Europe, Japan, and Canada,
because any delays or breakdowns in discussions
over acceptance of President Reagan's invitation
would have to be reported back to the summit
leaders at their next get-together. Although more
time would be needed to find ways in which the
U.S. invitation and the separate space goals and
ambitions of Europe, Japan, and Canada could be
combined in ways acceptable to all partners, there
was now a deadline to provide a focus for deliber-
ations around the world.
Even creating an initial agreement to work togeth-
er in seeking such a melding of interests, capabili-
ties, and programs would require separate negotia-
tions between the United States and each of its
potential partners. Europe, Japan, and Canada had
been engaging in informal discussions with the
United States regarding possible space station coop-
eration since January 1982. However, as they made
their own space plans, they certainly had not been
able to count on the station gaining the early and
unambiguous approval of the Reagan administra-
tion that was communicated by including approval
of the program in Reagan's State of the Union mes-
sage. President Reagan's approval of the station and
his invitation to participate changed the context in a
major way. Europe and its major countries active in
space—France, West Germany, Great Britain, and
Italy—as well as other potential U.S. partners were
making their own plans and decisions based on
their own interests, and the role of large-scale col-
laboration with the United States had to be evaluat-
ed in terms of those interests. As one close observer
of the European space scene remarked (and his
remarks were in many ways applicable to Japan and
Canada as well):
The dilemma which faces countries of Europe as
America's space station program begins to get
underway concerns chiefly priorities, both
national and European. To maintain Europe's
existing space programs and take on a new space
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station activity would require a major increase in
space-related expenditures and thus a reappraisal
of national priorities.
To some, it might appear that the U.S. would be
called upon to provide guarantees and accept
dependence in excess of what Europe's share of
the common burden will be worth. But the
imbalance is the other way: Any substantial
European involvement in a U.S.-led space station
program would absorb so much of the space
budget that Europe would forfeit the ability to
create a similar but independent capability.86
The invitation by Reagan to participate in the
space station program had been a true leadership
initiative; it was now up to the potential partners as
to whether they chose to follow the U.S. lead.
Europe Charts Its Future in Space87
Much had changed in Europe since the post-
Apollo agreement to develop Spacelab as part of
the U.S. Space Transportation System. European
commitment to the German- and Italian-led
Spacelab program had been part of a "package
deal" among countries interested in space. Other
elements of that deal were multilateral funding of
a French-led program to develop an independent
launcher for Europe, Ariane, and a British-led pro-
gram to develop a maritime communications satel-
lite. In addition, eleven European nations had
agreed to create a single organization to manage
programs in science, applications, and infrastruc-
ture development. By the time the U.S. invitation
for space station participation was extended,
Spacelab had had a successful first flight aboard
the Space Shuttle. Ariane was in service and suc-
cessfully launching both government and commer-
cial payloads, and the maritime satellite was in
operation, serving as the initial basis for the
INMARSAT organization. ESA had developed into
an effective means of combining the resources of
member states to support programs that not one of
them was able to carry out on a unilateral basis;
ESA programs combined with national efforts had
led to the emergence of a vigorous space industri-
al base in Europe.
ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option
Considerations of future programs were very
much on the European agenda in the early 1980s, as
the efforts begun on the basis of the 1973 package
deal approached completion and European indus-
try, national space agencies, and ESA assessed ways
of building on past achievements. The possibility of
European involvement in a U.S. space station pro-
gram was part of these considerations from the start.
Indeed, as long ago as 1976, being aware of early
U.S. space station studies, the ESA Council (the
organization's "Board of Directors" composed of
representatives from its member states) had resolved
that ESA should "examine the questions connected
with a possible participation by Europe in the Space
Station programme. "88
In February 1982, NASA Administrator James
Beggs and ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard
discussed potential NASA-ESA cooperation on the
station program; each directed their head of
advanced planning (Ivan Bekey for NASA and
Jacques Collet for ESA) to work together as station
planning gained momentum. 89 Based on this guid-
ance, a detailed plan for NASA-ESA coordination
and joint activity regarding station planning was
quickly developed; Europe was thus given the
opportunity to be involved in the station program
almost from its inception. 90 By June 1982, ESA and
NASA had agreed on an approach in which ESA
would carry out two sets of space station–related
studies. One, to be called "European Utilization
Aspects of a U.S. Manned Space Station," would
be conducted in parallel to U.S. mission require-
ments studies; other ESA studies would investigate
the architectural and implementation implications
of European requirements—that is, what hardware
made sense for Europe to contribute to a station
program. In September 1982, ESA awarded the
contract for the utilization study to the German
aerospace research establishment, DFVLR, and ini-
tiated four contracts with European industry
regarding potential hardware contributions.
These initial steps in European consideration of
station participation were taken in anticipation of
ESA member-state approval of a "Space
Transportation Systems Long-Term Preparatory
Programme" (STSLTPP) that would provide the over-
all context for charting Europe's future plans in the
area of launch and in-orbit systems. The STSLTPP
had been approved in principle by the ESA Council
in June 1982." It was intended to provide member
states "the elements necessary for making decisions
on the selection of a long-term policy and on the
start of new programmes" to follow Ariane and
Spacelab. Among the options to be analyzed by the
STSLTPP were "investigation and preparation of the
necessary decision elements on: maintaining in
Europe an independent launch capability, develop-
ing a European in-orbit infrastructure, and pursuing
transatlantic cooperation through participation in
the future United States space station programme."
One of the three "themes" to be investigated was
how to "provide Europe with a capability of carry-
ing out orbital operations (including return to Earth)
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by means of in-orbit infrastructures developed inde-
pendently or by cooperation with NASA in the
future U.S. space station activities. "92
While staff members of ESA may have wel-
comed the possibility of continued cooperation
with the United States, their attitude was not uni-
versally shared in Europe. It proved difficult to get
member-state commitment to the STSLTPP, in large
part because of skepticism in some countries
regarding the wisdom of continuing intimate coop-
eration with the United States. NASA European
Representative Richard Barnes reported in
December 1982 that the ESA Council had "again
deferred, this time for a month, the deadline for
member states adherence to the . . . STSLTPP
which includes funding for Ariane 5 and Space
Station studies. So far only Sweden, Belgium,
Denmark, and Germany have formally signed up,
with Germany the only strong supporter of Space
Station studies. 1193
In the weeks following the December ESA Council
meeting, advocates of at least examining cooperation
were able to gather the support needed for carrying
out the STSLTPP. France agreed to support the study
program on December 22, Italy on January 6, 1983,
and the United Kingdom on January 14. With the four
major ESA members signed on, study efforts were
able to go forward during 1983 and 1984.
Commenting on the adoption of the program, the
leading French newspaper, Le Figaro, noted:
The old continent is preparing its space activity for
the next century: we will undoubtedly have then
our space-men, orbital infrastructure and maybe,
also a mini-shuttle to fly on our own. At least that's
what ESA—who is initiating an important
engineering program in this regard and has already
signed the first industrial study contract—thinks.
Hopefully, we will know between now and 1985.
At the same time we will know who will influence
this long-term policy: Germany who favors
complete cooperation with NASA, or France, more
favorable to independent solutions.
At the moment, two philosophies are possible. On
the one hand, the one of German industrialists
that consider that Europe should work in full
cooperation with the U.S.... From there,
however, opinions diverge: The French, in fact,
would like to keep a certain "independence" as
far as manned flights are concerned and thus
conduct studies in such a manner as to preserve
the means to equip Europe with a complete
[Space Transportation System] to embark men.
The problem is, one can imagine, that it would be
very expensive....
Thus, the main task is to convince our European
partners of the value of those expenses.
However, in order to succeed, France will first
have to resolve its own contradictions: Some of
us still believe that the space exploitation will be
a reality by the end of the century without any
human presence, which is counter to the future
outlook on both the American and Soviet sides.
As long as such opinions carry weight in France,
it will certainly be difficult to claim to be able to
influence ESA's decisions."'
Not all early thinking about space station cooper-
ation was carried out within the ESA framework.
Another focus for considering potential European
contributions to the U.S. space station emerged
from studies carried out by Germany and Italy.
Interest within the two countries in using Spacelab
hardware as the basis for future programs dated
back to the late 1970s. Advocates of continued
cooperation with the United States, particularly
within Germany, sought an approach that would
preserve the option of cooperation, either through
ESA or outside of it. In 1983, the German firm,
MBB/ERNO, and the Italian firm, Aeritalia, under
the respective supervision of DFVLR and the Italian
CNR (the national research agency in charge of the
Italian space plan), began intense studies of the use,
either in conjunction with the U.S. space station or
as an independent European-controlled orbital
complex, of an orbital infrastructure consisting of
Space] ab-derived pressurized modules, unmanned
platforms, support modules, and service vehicles.
The name given to this orbital complex was
Columbus; the program was "viewed by some
countries as a German/Italian effort to secure the
lead role in Europe's space station development.""'
The French space agency, Centre Nationale
d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES), and the French aero-
space industry also were studying future space
efforts in the early 1980s. One focus of attention
was a new high-thrust rocket engine, designated
HM60, designed to use liquid hydrogen and liquid
oxygen as fuels; such an engine would be used to
develop a new generation of the Ariane launcher,
designated Ariane 5. In other studies, attention was
given to an automated or human-tended space sta-
tion concept called Solaris and to a small winged
spaceplane called Hermes. As NASA began space
station studies in 1982, CNES set up its own exam-
ination of station mission requirements. The goals
of this study were to allow CNES "to determine
independently its interest in cooperating with
NASA on a future space station; but also to deter-
mine whether it is in their best interest to cooper-
ate through ESA or directly with NASA. "91 Although
the French government had traditionally been
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skeptical of the importance of human spaceflight
activities, this attitude shifted 180 degrees follow-
ing President Francois Mitterrand's decision to
accept a Soviet invitation to fly a Frenchman
aboard the Soviet Salyut space station. That flight
took place in June 1982. France from this time on
increasingly argued that independent European
capabilities in all areas of space activities, includ-
ing human access to orbit, were essential; the term
"autonomy" was used to describe this ability to act
without dependence on others. The appropriate
balance between European autonomy and inti-
mate engagement with the United States became a
major issue in the 1983-1985 debate over
European space policy.
In 1984, Germany and Italy proposed to their
ESA partners that Columbus be considered as an
optional program 97 to be carried out within the ESA
framework; France did the same for the HM60
engine. These proposals were approved in princi-
ple by the ESA Council on June 28, 1984. ESA was
authorized to attempt to gain member-state finan-
cial commitments for preparatory studies, prior to
a final decision to proceed, on the development of
the large cryogenic HM60 engine and on a "space
station related programme based on the proposal
by the German and Italian delegations ... this pro-
gramme will be defined with a view to ensure pro-
gressively the European autonomy in the field of
manned space station compatible with the future
European launching systems." The Columbus
preparatory programme would also include "con-
sideration of the invitation received from the
President of the U.S. 1198
The ESA staff spent the remainder of 1984 incor-
porating the Columbus program and plans for a new
European launcher into an overall long-range
European space plan. (They were also working
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closely with the NASA space station planners to stay
abreast of U.S. activity, now that the space station
had received President Reagan's approval.) Other
inputs into this plan came from the results of the
STSLTPP and from the planning activities of other
offices within ESA concerned with science and
applications programs. That long-range plan was
ready for initial consideration by ESA member coun-
tries in November. The introduction to the plan
noted the need to find the right balance between:
1. Science and applications—between cultural
and economic rewards
2. Payloads and launchers/in-orbit infrastruc-
ture—between ends and means
Launcher development and manned space
flight—between major technological
avenues, that of propulsion and that of
human-in-orbit
4. Manned space systems and automated space
systems—between humans and robots
ESA program and national program—
between centralized and decentralized
activities
Purely European program and cooperative
ones, in particular with the United States—
between achieving space autonomy and
undertaking large-scale programs and their
operation
The ESA executive alerted member states that
"the present scope of the overall ESA programme
will have to be enlarged, making it necessary to
increase the funding at an average rate of 12 per-
cent a year over 5 years. "99
The plan recommended that Europe develop a
new launcher, Ariane 5, based on the HM60
engine, to become operational by the end of 1995.
It noted that the U.S. space station was a "major
step in space capability which Europe cannot
afford to ignore" and recommended "until about
1995, to improve through cooperation with NASA
the existing European manned flight operations."
To this end, the plan proposed approval of the
Columbus program, "involving cooperation with
the U.S. in the development, operation and uti-
lization of an international space station, subject to
negotiation with NASA of satisfactory terms and
conditions for such cooperation." In conclusion,
the ESA plan suggested that "the most urgent task
ahead is for Member States to reach a broad con-
sensus, within the ESA forum, on a well-balanced
and ambitious programme for the next ten years,
derived from a shared vision of Europe's future in
space.""'
Developing Political Support for Station
Cooperation
In fact, the elements of such a consensus had
been emerging in Europe during 1984. The June
ESA Council decision to approve the HM60 and
Columbus preparatory programs had foreshad-
owed a new "package deal" to guide Europe's next
decade in space. While studies sponsored by ESA
and national space agencies defined possible hard-
ware elements of the next generation of European
space capabilities and of potential European con-
tributions to the U.S. space station, political-level
discussions among the leading European coun-
tries—particularly France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Italy—were leading to agreement
on how those elements could be combined in an
acceptable fashion. A key to these discussions, in
addition to agreement on the hardware elements to
be included, was developing an understanding on
how various ESA member states would distribute
among themselves the costs, and the proportional
industrial involvement, in the various elements of
the ESA plan.
The major difference of view that had to be
resolved in these discussions was between the
long-standing French preference for an emphasis
on improved launch systems and for an approach
that stressed European autonomy and the German
and Italian preference for both continued develop-
ment of human spaceflight capability and continued
close cooperation with the United States in that
development. Another consideration was the British
preference for ESA to undertake applications pro-
grams that produced tangible benefits, rather than
research or exploration-oriented activities. For most
of the smaller ESA member states, a primary concern
was a program with enough diversity and breadth to
allow meaningful opportunities for their scientific and
industrial participation. These differing preferences
had been accommodated in the 1973 package deal
that had guided European space activities for a
decade; during 1984, the political support for a simi-
lar combination grew. The need to respond to the
U.S. invitation to participate in its space station pro-
gram certainly accelerated the process of agreement
and shaped its content, but the desire for a new
European commitment to its future in space was an
equally influential stimulus.
A meeting of the ESA Council, at which each mem-
ber state would be represented by its cabinet minister
responsible for space activities, was scheduled for the
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end of January 1985. This was the first European
space meeting at the ministerial level since the
1973 gathering that had created ESA and
approved the Ariane and Spacelab programs. The
purpose of the January 1985 meeting was to con-
sider the long-range plan proposed by ESA. In the
course of putting together that plan, there had
been close consultation among the ESA Director
General"' and senior members of the ESA execu-
tive staff and policy-level officials within the gov-
ernments of ESA member states. The European
aerospace industrial organization, Eurospace, had
put together a proposed long-term European
space program that reflected the views of its
industry members; it was in essence the same as
the proposed ESA long-range plan, suggesting that
European industry was ready to lend its support to
the ESA proposals. 102 The major unresolved ques-
tion as 1984 drew to a close was whether those
proposals would receive the political and finan-
cial support needed to move ahead. Ultimately, it
was up to the individual ESA member states—and
particularly France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom (Italy had already answered in the posi-
tive)—to decide whether they wanted to increase
their financial and political commitment to space,
and to ESA, to the levels required to carry out the
program that ESA was proposing.
The British Position. At the time that President
Reagan first invited international participation in
the station program, the United Kingdom was per-
haps the most skeptical of the major ESA member
states regarding both a significant increase in the
ESA budget and significant European engagement
in the U.S. space station effort. These would
require additional funds at a time when the
Thatcher government was giving overriding priori-
ty to cutting the U.K. budget. In addition, early dis-
cussions of potential European contributions to the
U.S. space station had not clearly identified any
element or activity of particular interest to Britain.
This latter issue was resolved during 1984. The
concept of the German-Italian Columbus program
included one or more automated platforms to carry
scientific and applications instruments. The lead-
ing U.K. space firm, British Aerospace, became
interested in having the lead role in supplying
these platforms—particularly an Earth-observing
platform in polar orbit to complement a similar
polar platform that was part of the "distributed
architecture" of the U.S. station concept."' An
important feature of European space planning is
the ability to reach informal agreements on which
a country's firms would act as prime and sec-
ondary contractors for various ESA programs in
advance of their actual approval. Germany and
Italy agreed to allocate to Britain and to British
Aerospace the lead role in the platform aspects of
the Columbus program, and this provided the
incentive the British government needed to go
along with the proposed ESA long-range plan and
European participation in the U.S. space station
program. Even so, some degree of skepticism
about the appropriate priority of space activities
overall and of ESA programs in particular lingered
among some in the Thatcher government and the
British bureaucracy, although Thatcher herself was
visibly enthusiastic about the station program,
once she had been briefed on it in preparation for
the London Economic Summit. In fact, at the sum-
mit meeting, it was Thatcher who had taken the
lead in the discussion as the seven leaders gath-
ered around the space station model.-,
To build a broader base of support for the space
station program within Britain, the U.K.
Department of Trade and Industry, under whose
auspices the space program operated, organized
an October 4, 1984, meeting on the station pro-
gram. The new Minister of Trade and Industry,
Geoffrey Pattie, told the meeting that the govern-
ment "had no preconceptions" and thus was very
interested in the opinion of attendees on whether
Great Britain should support station cooperation
within ESA; the tone of Pattie's remarks to the sym-
posium, however, were quite positive toward sta-
tion participation. A summary of the meeting noted
general agreement that "the Space Station is a log-
ical development" and "surprising unanimity that
we should go ahead via ESA." 105 One NASA official
visiting the United Kingdom in the fall of 1984
reported that top British space officials "appeared
optimistic about Cabinet approval for a major
British contribution to the ESA Space Station pro-
gram." 106 When the U.K. cabinet did meet in late
1984, it decided to provide those funds and to
make the accompanying commitment to coopera-
tion with the United States on the station program.
The French Position. Italian support for station
cooperation and for the ESA long-range plan incor-
porating it had never been in question. What was
uncertain as the January 1985 ESA ministerial
meeting grew closer was whether France and
Germany could find an approach to Europe's
future in space that reflected the interests of both
countries. Earlier, the outlines of a French-German
compromise that would enable agreement on
future ESA programs had been evident in the June
1984 ESA Council approval of preparatory pro-
grams for the HM60 cryogenic engine and for the
Columbus program. The proposed ESA long-term
plan was based on these central features.
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France complicated the situation in late 1984 by
requesting "Europeanization" of its Hermes space-
plane, arguing that just completed internal French
studies had demonstrated the feasibility of the con-
cept and that the goal of European autonomy was not
achievable unless Europe had its own means of
access to space for human crews. This last-minute
push for Hermes was a surprise to most and was not
well received by space advocates in other major
European countries, particularly Germany and Great
Britain, because it implied a higher cost for the over-
all space "package" that they were already having
some difficulty selling to their finance ministries. In
France, by contrast, strong support for space came
from Francois Mitterrand, who had early on in his
presidency accepted the Gaullist notion of space as
an arena in which to demonstrate French grandeur. In
addition, the French Minister of Research, Hubert
Curien, had been head of CNES before being
appointed as Minister, and he was actively pushing
his counterparts in other countries for approval of the
Hermes concept.
France had been advocating Hermes since the
middle of 1983; the Mitterrand government had
decided to make the space plane a key element of
a plan for French space preeminence in Europe.
One justification for Hermes was that it could give
Europe independent crew access to the space sta-
tion, so that Europe did not have to be totally
dependent on the Space Shuttle. This was part of a
more general French strategy of offering Europe an
alternative to dependence on a close alliance with
the United States as a key to its space future,
should discussions on station cooperation falter.
When France pushed its partners during 1984 to
include Hermes development in the package to be
considered by the January 1985 ministerial meet-
ing, both the United Kingdom and Germany resist-
ed, believing that there had been inadequate study
of the concept to justify a commitment to its devel-
opment and being less committed to the political-
ly driven concept of European autonomy in space
than was France. 107 France continued to advocate
Hermes right up to the time of the ESA ministerial
meeting. During January 1985, Fredric d'Allest,
CNES Director General, made a tour of European
capitals in an attempt to increase support for the
concept. On January 29, just two days before the
meeting convened, a column by d'Allest titled "A
Space Policy for Europe" appeared in the influen-
tial French paper Le Monde. In it, d'Allest argued:
Participation—with conditions yet to be
negotiated—in the American space station
through the Columbus project would allow
Europe to benefit earlier from the use of the
space station by conducting experiments that she
would find useful and at low cost.
However, the sour experience of Spacelab
cooperation, as well as the U.S. policy to limit
technology and technical information transfer to
the bare essentials to insure the compatibility of
European and U.S. elements, indicate the
limitation of such a cooperation. That is why a
European policy in this field cannot count
heavily on cooperation with the U.S.
Because of the major stakes involved, France has
the same determination as she did 10 years ago
in Brussels when she convinced her European
partners to build Ariane. France proposes a
fundamental new step forward in European space
programs by deciding, right now, to acquire its
autonomy in manned space flight and the
progressive establishment of a European Space
Station.""
The German Position. While support for space
station cooperation with the United States had
always been strong among German space officials
and in the German aerospace industry, during the
1982-1983 period, political support for the under-
taking was not yet assured. However, events in late
1983 changed this situation.
One of those events was the visit to Washington
of Dr. Heinz Riesenhuber, German Minister for
Research and Technology. Prior to Riesenhuber's
meeting with James Beggs, Ken Pedersen told the
NASA Administrator that the minister "was report-
edly very favorably impressed with the amount of
public interest in space which was generated by
the visit of the [Shuttle test vehicle] Enterprise to
Bonn in May 1983." Pedersen noted that "one pur-
pose of discussions with Riesenhuber is to promote
station activities, especially international coopera-
tive activities. "109
Based on his discussions in Washington,
Riesenhuber became an enthusiastic advocate of
station cooperation; during the following years, he
became an essential U.S. ally in securing European
participation in the station program. Returning to
Bonn, he wrote James Beggs on October 27 that:
While 1 am aware that there is no approved
program, I am interested in coordinating with
you as early as possible, even prior to the final
decision, the possibilities of a European
participation in a space station in the now
ongoing preparatory phase. I would be quite
willing to take the initiative as to the point that
the Federal Republic of Germany, based on her
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coordinating responsibility in the Spacelab
cooperation, will provide the necessary political
and programmatic prerequisites for a European
participation in the space station.10
The support of Riesenhuber, and indeed of
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for continued
space cooperation with the United States was rein-
forced by the first successful Spacelab flight in late
November 1983. President Reagan and Kohl
engaged in a three-way live conversation with the
Spacelab crew, which included the first ESA astro-
naut, German citizen Ulf Merbold. After the mis-
sion, Kohl wrote Reagan that the mission should be
seen "as a symbol of our joint future.""'
The importance placed by Riesenhuber on
assuring political support within Europe for station
cooperation was a critical factor in the European
decision-making process during 1984. Late in
1984, Riesenhuber and French Minister of
Research Hubert Curien came to agreement on
German support for Ariane 5 and French support
for Columbus, if only their respective governments
would approve the budgets required; this "space
summit" was a critical step in clearing the path for
the Rome ESA ministerial meeting.
However, even with Riesenhuber's strong support
and the long-term bias toward cooperation with the
United States in space, German support for the ESA
long-range plan was not assured as the Rome min-
isterial meeting drew near. A major sticking point
was budget. A German commitment to the large
programs proposed by ESA—Columbus and Ariane
5—implied either an increase in the German space
budget overall or a reallocation of the resources of
Riesenhuber's Research and Technology Ministry.
German space scientists (echoing their U.S. col-
leagues) were skeptical of the scientific value of the
space station and strongly opposed to a reduction in
the space science budget as a means of financing it.
German Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, on
the other hand, resisted increasing the Research and
Technology Ministry's budget to allow for the addi-
tional funding required. Another factor that came
into play was the preference of Foreign Minister
Genscher for closer Franco-German ties rather than
continued emphasis on the transatlantic German-
U.S. alliance."'
This potential deadlock within the government of
the strongest European supporter of station cooper-
ation was worrisome to the United States. On
December 13, President Reagan wrote Chancellor
Kohl, reiterating U.S. hopes that Germany would
agree to participate in the station project.13
The controversy was settled in early January
when Riesenhuber and Stoltenberg agreed to a com-
promise. Enough additional funds would be provid-
ed to the Research and Technology Ministry to cover
half of the costs of German participation in the
Columbus and Ariane 5 programs; the Ministry
would reprogram some of its existing budget to sup-
port the rest of the cost of those programs. The U.S.
Embassy in Bonn reported that the German cabinet
would "make a final decision on space station par-
ticipation at a January 16 meeting. This will be little
more than a formality, since the Chancellor is
known to be in favor of the Space Station and has
only been waiting for his ministers to agree on a
financing plan.""" The cabinet did meet on January
16 and agreed to German participation. A press
release announcing the cabinet decision noted that
"our cooperation in space research is an important
step on the way toward European integration and
continuous improvement of transatlantic friend-
ship." Prerequisites for successful cooperation,
noted the statement, included:
• assurance of an appropriate relation between
give and take,
• guarantees for access and necessary services,
such as transport with the space shuttle,
support and data transmission under
nondiscriminatory conditions,
guarantee of unlimited scientific and
commercial utilization of results gained,
unrestricted technology transfer for the
development of ESA's own contribution and
for the commercial utilization of
instrumentation and results, and options for
the utilization of European launcher
capabilities.1'
The reference to the use of European launchers
did not imply German support for Hermes. In a
press conference following the cabinet meeting,
Riesenhuber said that it was "premature" to decide
on a commitment to Hermes, but that Germany
had not ruled out participating in the program
sometime in the future.1'
ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station
Cooperation
Despite this rejection of French aspirations, at
least for the time being, by the beginning of January
1985, the U.K., French, and Italian governments had
indicated their intent to approve the ESA-proposed
plan, which at the time included no mention of
Hermes. With the German approval of its participa-
tion in the Ariane 5 and Columbus projects, the last
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obstacle to approval of the ESA long-range plan, and
to political agreement to the principle of European
participation in the space station program, had been
cleared. The ESA Council met in Paris on January 23
in preparation for the ministerial-level meeting the fol-
lowing week, and it discovered that the agency's
member states were in agreement on all essential
decisions to be taken at Rome.
Meeting in Rome at the ministerial level on January
30-31, 1985, the ESA Council accepted the proposals
of the ESA executive for a long-range European space
plan and agreed to the initial two-year commitment of
funds required to carry out that plan. In so doing, it
approved a statement of objectives for the ESA pro-
gram that included, among other goals, the intent:
to strengthen European space transportation
capacity, meeting foreseeable user
requirements within as well as outside
Europe, and remaining competitive with
space transportation systems that exist or are
planned elsewhere;
• to prepare autonomous European facilities
for the support of man in space, for the
transport of equipment and crews and for
making use of low Earth orbit; and
• to enhance international cooperation and in
particular aim at a partnership with the United
States through a significant participation in an
international space station."'
Although the French proposal to include
Hermes in the approved ESA program at the same
level of commitment as Ariane 5 and Columbus
was rebuffed, the ministers left the door to future
Europeanization of Hermes wide open, taking note
with interest of the French decision to undertake
the spaceplane program and the proposal by
France to associate her European partners interest-
ed in this program. The ministers invited France
and associated partners to keep the agency
informed of progress of these studies with the view
of including this program, as soon as feasible, in
the optional program of the agency.1'
With these decisions, Europe committed itself to
an ambitious future space program of its own and
accepted, subject to the negotiation of acceptable
terms and conditions, the U.S. invitation to partic-
ipate in what ESA insisted on describing as an
"international space station," rather than a U.S.
station with foreign participation. (The differences
in these two characterizations were more than
semantic, because the degree of non-U.S. partici-
pation and the consequent share in the content
and control of station development and operations
were unsettled issues as far as Europe and other
participants were concerned, while within the
United States a decision that America must have
the dominant station role had already been made.)
With respect to what acceptable terms and condi-
tions of a space station partnership might be, there
had been, at least since 1983, clear indications of
the European position. Preliminary discussions on
a NASA-ESA agreement had been under way for
several months in anticipation of a positive out-
come at the ministerial meeting.
The European ministers at Rome went on record
as to the objectives that had to be met if the space
station partnership were to be viable in European
eyes. Those objectives were stated in the form of an
ESA resolution that was not made public until it had
been delivered to both President Reagan and NASA
Administrator Beggs. The resolution noted, with
respect to the U.S. invitation, that the ESA Council:
Accepts that offer—with a view to contributing
and strengthening a genuine partnership in the
space field with the United States of America ...
subject to the achievement of the following
fundamental objectives:
- to seek an appropriate European participation
by the Agency in the space station programme;
- to give Europe responsibility for the design,
development, exploitation and evolution of one
or several identifiable elements of the space
station together with the responsibility for their
management with the aim of increasing the
overall capability of the space station;
- to ensure that Europe may have access to and
use, on a nondiscriminatory basis, all elements
of the space station system on terms that are as
favourable as those granted to the most-
favoured users and on a reciprocal basis;
- to reach a satisfactory agreement on the share
of the operation costs of the station;
- to reach a satisfactory agreement on the level
and conditions for the appropriate transfer of
technologies;
- to ensure that supplies and services provided
by the United States industry and NASA for
European requirements are offset by European
supplies and services;
- to ensure maximum legal security and an
identical level of the commitments entered into
by the European Governments and the United
States Government,
- to guarantee the availability of American
transportation and communication facilities
required for the programme and the possibility
of using the European facilities as they
become available for the programme.1'
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This statement of objectives identified almost all
of the issues that would have to be resolved in
what turned out to be three more years of detailed
and difficult negotiations between the United
States and Europe—and also with Japan and
Canada—in creating the final framework of agree-
ments for the original station partnership.
Because U.S.-European space cooperation in the
space station would be based on a longer, more
intense, and sometimes difficult history than with
other prospective partners,"' and because the antic-
ipated European contribution to the partnership
would be approximately twice (in financial terms)
that expected from Japan and more than four times
that expected from Canada, European acceptance of
the U.S. invitation was an important achievement
for those within the United States advocating the
station partnership. Without European involvement,
the partnership they had in mind would have been
much different in character.
Even after the Rome meeting, there was linger-
ing opposition to station cooperation in Europe.
France made it clear that it was ready to take the
lead in a program leading to European autonomy,
should space station negotiations run into major
obstacles. Smaller ESA member states, who in gen-
eral did not see industrial return proportionate to
the costs to them of station participation, remained
skeptical. However, the political strength of an
invitation from the U.S. President kept this opposi-
tion muted in character. Only if the terms laid
down by the United States for participation were
unacceptable was it likely that Europe would
refuse to be the primary partner of the United
States in the space station program.
Japan Determined Not to "Miss the Boatf127
Once the United States had formally invited
Japan to participate in the space station program,
there was little doubt that invitation would be
accepted. During the 1969-1970 period, the
United States had asked Japan to become involved
in the planned post-Apollo program of manned
spaceflight. At that time, Japan was just getting
started on a large-scale space program, even
though it had been carrying out small scientific
space activities throughout the 1960s. It took Japan
some time to form the internal consensus required
to respond positively to the U.S. invitation; by the
time its response came, the conditions for post-
Apollo cooperation had so changed that the
opportunity Japan had decided to pursue was no
longer available. 12' So Japan was excluded from
any opportunity to work with the United States in
the human flight area during the 1970s. When the
chance to become involved in the space station
appeared, according to one informed observer,
"Japan—politicians included—does not want to
miss the boat. The Japanese space community
wants to participate ." ' Z'
President Reagan's invitation to participate in
the U.S. space station program came at a difficult
time for Japan, however. The country's space bud-
get, after rising rapidly during the 1970s, had
shown a slight decrease in 1983 over 1982, and no
meaningful growth was planned for 1984."' Even
so, a revised space development policy for Japan
had just been proposed, and an implication of that
policy was an increased Japanese commitment to
space over the longer term. A central guideline of
that policy was "establishment of autonomy." The
policy proposal noted that:
In the space technology field, Japan has been
relying on advanced foreign nations in its large
portion because of her later starting, and the
activities have been under the great influence of
such advanced nations.
Japan should, however, establish its own
technological capacity for its space development in
the future so that its broad and diversified space
development activities can be performed in a
steady manner.
At the same time, Japan should possess advanced
capability in order to implement space
development activities properly at its discretion.12'
The "advanced nation" referred to in the policy
proposal was the United States, and the "techno-
logical capability" important to Japanese autono-
my included both an indigenous launcher and an
indigenous satellite bus incorporating advanced
technologies. The United States had helped Japan
develop launch vehicles and satellites during the
1970s by licensing U.S. industry to sell various
technologies to its Asian ally, but those licenses
carried limits on how advanced the technology
thereby transferred could be. The objective was to
license only that technology less advanced than
the current U.S. "state of the art." In addition,
Japan could not launch non-Japanese payloads
using the boosters employing licensed U.S. tech-
nology without explicit U.S. permission to do so.12'
Japan recognized, as had Europe a decade ear-
1 ier, that its independent access to space was a pre-
condition for any degree of autonomy and, in early
1984, was in the final stages of deciding to devel-
op a new launch vehicle, to be called the H-II,
based totally on Japanese-developed technology.
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The H-II program was aimed at a first launch in
1991, and it was estimated to cost almost $1 bil-
lion to develop. 117 To accept President Reagan's
invitation meant that Japan would have to commit
itself to even more increases in its space budget,
because the kind of contribution the United States
was asking would be as expensive, if not more
expensive, than the projected cost of the H-II pro-
gram. While space advocates in Japan were enthu-
siastic about the possibility, the space program did
not have a high priority outside of the science and
technology community, and it was uncertain
whether the government would be willing to make
the financial commitment required to carry out
both the H-II and space station programs.
The Japanese space community had been con-
sidering its response to a possible U.S. invitation
since NASA had raised that possibility in early
1982. In August of that year, it had established an
Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station Programs,
reporting to the blue-ribbon Space Activities
Commission that advised the prime minister on
space policy. In typical Japanese style when con-
sidering a new area of activity, the membership of
this committee included representatives from vari-
ous government ministries and their national
research institutes, Japanese industry, and academ-
ic institutions with potential interest in the space
station program. This step was also taken to indi-
cate that Japan considered the space station to be
a project of government-wide interest, not just the
concern of one Japanese agency.
Japanese space activities were carried out by
two separate organizations. One, the Institute of
Space and Astronautical Sciences ([SAS), was total-
ly devoted to space science; it had evolved from a
University of Tokyo group and was still quite aca-
demic in style. ISAS received its relatively modest
funding from the Ministry of Education, and it
cherished its independence from the rest of
Japanese space efforts. The bulk of Japanese space
work was carried out under the management of the
National Space Development Agency (NASDA),
which was a public corporation operating under
the policy guidance of the Science and Technology
Agency (STA), although it received funding from
other government ministries and public corpora-
tions as well as from STA. In mid-1982, the Space
Activities Commission formally designated
NASDA as the lead agency in Japan for space sta-
tion planning. 128
On an informal basis, Japan had been examining
possibilities for involvement in the space station pro-
gram from the start of 1982. On July 16 of that year,
the government established a space station task force;
that group managed Japan's mission requirements
studies that were carried out in parallel with similar
NASA studies and other station-related investiga-
tions."' By October 1982, NASDA was able to join
with several other organizations to sponsor a space
station symposium in Tokyo; almost 400 attendees
heard 92 papers presented."'
Japanese industry was quick to get involved. By
September 1982, the Mitsubishi Group had briefed
the government on its concepts for participation,
which included an "Experiment Module" consist-
ing of "a manned pressurized module and an
unpressurized pallet." According to Mitsubishi,
Japanese participation would:
• Establish a Japanese base for future space ac-
tivities by participating in the U.S. Manned
Space Station ... Program
• Enlarge the field and scale of Japanese space
utilization activities
• Invest and participate in the rapidly
progressing advanced space technology
•	 Contribute to the international society in a
worldwide cooperative space development era
• Activate and promote Japanese manned
space activities."'
(The Mitsubishi presentation so impressed
NASA Administrator James Beggs that he sent a
copy to Secretary of State George Shultz as an
example of the benefits of international coopera-
tion in the space station, which would "provide an
opportunity to attract foreign research and devel-
opment funds into a program which is perhaps
uniquely mutually beneficial ... ... 12 ) Other space
industries in Japan also studied the concept of an
attached experimental module; also under investi-
gation was a Japanese contribution in the form of a
free-flying, unmanned experimental platform.
In March 1983, the Space Activities Commission
and its Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station
Programs met with a NASA delegation led by
Associate Deputy Administrator Philip Culbertson
(to whom the NASA Space Station Task Force report-
ed). The NASA team also met with people from STA,
NASDA, and ISAS. The main purpose of these meet-
ings was to provide Japanese officials concerned
with the space station an in-person, top-level view
of NASA's space station planning activities and to
indicate how Japanese activities fit into those plans.
The NASA delegation stressed at every opportunity
that the station program had not yet been fully
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defined, much less approved by the White House
and Congress. With regard to specific Japanese
hardware contributions to the station, the NASA
representatives noted that the Japanese "still had a
lot of work ahead to prove to themselves—and
us—that they should undertake developments of
this scope.""'
On June 15, 1983, the Ad Hoc Committee on
Space Station Programs of the Space Activities
Commission issued an interim report that identified
materials processing, life science, and advanced
technology development as the uses most likely to
benefit from the existence of a space station. The
committee thought that a module attached to the
space station was the best site for work in these
areas, and it concluded that "a very large space sys-
tem can be built" and that "the space station is the
first step of the enlargement of the living space of
human being[s]." 14 Throughout the year, Japanese
interest in station participation continued to
increase. For example, in October the influential
paper, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported that:
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. will participate in the U.S.
space station program in collaboration with
Hitachi, Ltd. and Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd... .
The Mitsubishi Group of firms have already
announced their policy of actively participating in
the program....
The Japanese government plans to participate in the
space station project from the beginning, that is,
even as the project is in the development stages.1'
By the time that James Beggs formally extended
President Reagan's invitation to participate to
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in March
1984, acceptance of that invitation was a foregone
conclusion, if acceptable terms for that participation
could be developed and if the Japanese Finance
Ministry and the Diet (the Japanese legislature) could
be convinced to provide the additional funds
required to support the cooperative undertaking. In
the revision of Japan's space development plan
unveiled in late February 1984, which gave the go-
ahead to the H-II rocket, the Space Activities
Commission had also indicated Japanese intent to
participate in the station program. At the time of the
Beggs visit, the Prime Minister Nakasone and the sci-
ence and technology minister made it clear that Japan
would participate in a meaningful way, but that gov-
ernment statements in support for the program would
remain low-key until the process of developing con-
sensus within Japan had taken place.
As part of the process of consensus-building with-
in Japan, during 1984, five industrial groups within
Japan—Mitsui, Fuyo, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and
Nisho-lwai—formed teams to study station utiliza-
tion and hardware development opportunities.
Within the government, the influential Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) became
involved in space station–related activities by creat-
ing its own study committee on space environment
utiliza-tion. Both of these developments caused
conflict. Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that there
was disagreement within the private sector over
which industrial group should have the lead in
Japan's involvement in the space station and that the
MITI move into space was viewed by STA as an
incursion into its area of jurisdiction.1'
In reaction to this situation, on November 19,
the powerful Keidanren (a federation of Japanese
industries) formed a fifty-four-member Ad Hoc
Committee for Promotion of Japanese Participation
in the Space Station Program. The purposes of this
group were "(1) to unify the space station use
research groups ...; (2) to coordinate the views of
the private sector; and (3) to coordinate informa-
tion with the ... STA and the ... MITI." This move
toward creating consensus was seen as essential if
STA was to get the budget allocation required to par-
ticipate in Phase B definition studies for the station."'
Indeed, it was the approval of this budget, rather
than any formal announcement, that would signal
Japan's acceptance of the U.S. invitation. By mid-
1984, STA had decided that Japan's contribution to
the space station should be an Experiment Module,
and studies of several other possible hardware ele-
ments were halted. In December, NASA confirmed
to STA that such a module would be an acceptable
Japanese contribution. 7' After negotiations with
the Ministry of Finance that had begun in August,
on December 28, STA "with great pleasure" noti-
fied NASA that the budget for Phase B station activ-
ities had been approved within the government
and would be sent to the Diet in January.1'
Members of the Keidanren space station study
committee visited the United States in February
1985 to hear for themselves U.S. responses to a
variety of questions that had been raised about the
station program. They were apparently satisfied
with what they heard. Upon his return to Japan,
the leader of the team, Tadahiro Sekimoto,
President of NEC (Nippon Electric Company),
wrote Administrator Beggs, telling him that "as the
Space Station Program is an international project
under your initiative, I hope you would go ahead
with it by way of cooperation ... between the two
countries. We will, of course, do our best on our
side to promote the Space Station Program. "10
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The Japanese Diet approved the funds for Japanese
Phase B station activities in April 1985; with that
approval, Japan became the last of the three potential
U.S. partners to make the political commitment to
attempt to find an acceptable framework for cooper-
ation. (Canada had announced its intention to partic-
ipate on March 18.) In its final report, issued in the
spring of 1985 and reflecting the thinking that led to
the Japanese acceptance of the U.S. invitation, the Ad
Hoc Committee on Space Station Programs of the
Space Activities Commission identified the benefits
Japan saw in participating in the station:
Acquisition of highly advanced technology:
It is expected that the space station will
utilize highly advanced technologies in
broad areas and, therefore, through the
program Japan will acquire extremely
advanced technologies such as manned
support technology, assembly technology for
a large structure in space, etc., and also will
encourage development of various advanced
technology areas in robotics, computers and
communications. This effort is expected to
contribute to the advancement of technical
standards not only in space but in many
other technical fields.
2. Promotion of the next generation science
and technology coupled with expansion of
space activities scope....
3. Contribution to international cooperation:
Japan's space development policy attaches
importance to harmonizing Japanese national
space development activities with
international space activities.... Japan's
participation and co-operation in the (space
station) program will be quite effective in
maintaining and further promoting the
friendship between the United States and
Japan, coupled with contributing to the
elevation of Japan's own technology, by
working with the space development
activities of the free world.
Encouragement of practical use of space
environment: The realization of the space
shuttle regular flights in the United States has
strongly pushed forward experiments in the
space environment for the production of
materials and pharmaceutical products using
the microgravity of space.... The expansion
of commercial activities to space is now a
target of various overseas countries as well as
the United States and, therefore, this aspect
has significance.-
As with Europe, then, Japan's decision on its
participation in the U.S. space station was part of a
larger set of decisions on future Japanese interests
in space overall. Also similar to Europe, Japan rec-
ognized that it could not both accept the U.S. offer
and satisfy its other space objectives without
increasing its financial commitment to space.
Finally, as with Europe, Japan saw as its ultimate
goal autonomy defined in terms of independence
of action in critical areas of space activity. But
unlike Europe, there were no influential skeptics
within Japan regarding the wisdom of accepting
the U.S. invitation, although the Japanese space
science community expressed little interest in
becoming involved with the station program. The
intense consultations and analyses within and
between government and industry from 1982 to
1984 had produced a consensus in support of inti-
mate collaboration with the United States in
exploring the potentials of human spaceflight.
Canada Sets Its Space Priorities1..
Although Canada had been actively involved in
space since the 1960s and had provided the Remote
Manipulator System (also called the Canadarm) as an
integral element of the Space Shuttle, the country in
the early 1980s had no central space agency. Also,
since the 1960s, it had renounced any ambitions
related to independent access to space through a
Canadian launch vehicle. Thus one of the considera-
tions influencing European and Japanese evaluation
of the U.S. space station invitation—the desire to
achieve substantial autonomy—was not relevant to
the Canadian situation. Canada, to be active in space,
had to cooperate; the issues were with whom and on
what projects.
Planning for Canada's space activities was the
responsibility of an Interdepartmental Committee
on Space, chaired by the Ministry of State for
Science and Technology. It included as members
those ministries that were potential developers and
users of space capabilities. Many space-related
research activities were funded and managed
through the National Research Council of Canada,
a quasi-independent government corporation. The
National Research Council had been Canada's link
to NASA for the Remote Manipulator System pro-
ject. The Ministry of Communications and the
Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Resources also had
substantial space involvement.
When the United States invited Canada in 1982
to begin to think about participation in the space
station program, other projects seemed to the
members of the Interdepartmental Committee on
Space to have higher priority as Canada shaped its
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space plans for the second half of the 1980s and
beyond. In particular, two large (for Canada) pro-
jects directly related to Canadian needs—a Mobile
Communication Satellite for links among Canada's
widely dispersed population and a Radarsat for
Earth observations through cloud cover—were
top-priority projects. In its initial evaluations, the
Interdepartmental Committee on Space gave
potential Canadian involvement in the U.S. space
station the lowest priority arnong these projects.
The factors that changed this ranking were pri-
marily political in character. The intense public inter-
est in the visit of the Space Shuttle test vehicle
Enterprise to Canada in June 1983 demonstrated to
Canadian politicians the symbolic importance of
involvement in human spaceflight. At the same time,
the Canadian government announced that it would
accept the U.S. invitation to have a Canadian astro-
naut fly aboard the Space Shuttle."' While within the
Interdepartmental Committee on Space the Ministry
of Energy, Mines, and Resources continued to advo-
cate the Radarsat program and the Ministry of
Communications continued its support of the Mobile
Satellite Program, from mid-1983, the Ministry of
State for Science and Technology had the political
advantage through its link to human spaceflight.
In contrast to the U.S.-European experience with
Spacelab cooperation, U.S.-Canadian cooperation
on the Remote Manipulator System had been a very
satisfactory experience on both sides. Karl Doetsch
of the National Research Council, who had man-
aged the Remote Manipulator System project for
Canada and was one of those supporting station
cooperation, remarked in mid-1983 that "there's a
good feeling that comes to the fore immediately,
which says that the space station is great, we want to
be a part of it.... However ... one needs a little
more than that. One needs to find good reasons for
it . If
To this end, the National Research Council of
Canada sponsored station utilization studies, as had
other potential station partners. Two studies were
conducted, one by Spar Aerospace Ltd. and the other
by a consulting group, Philip A. Lapp Associates. The
studies concluded that "Canada could benefit scien-
tifically, technologically, economically and socially
through participation in the development of the
Space Station."1' Particularly attractive to many
Canadian users was the existence of a polar orbiting
Earth observation platform as part of the station pro-
gram, because data from remote sensing was impor-
tant to many Canadian applications. Also, Canada
saw the station, with its requirements for in-orbit
assembly and operations, as an opportunity to build
on the Remote Manipulator System program and
to develop further Canadian industrial capabilities
in automation and robotics. 1' Summarizing the
position of station advocates within Canada,
Doetsch said:
We also think that the space station as a develop-
ment and as a technological stimulant has strong
justification in its own right. This is coupled with
the needs of the users, but it mustn't be forgotten.
The rate of return on investment is important, but
the strategic benefits are also important."'
Canadian-U.S. coordination at the technical level
continued during 1983 and 1984, but the political
decision on whether to accept President Reagan's
invitation to participate had to be put on hold. At the
time that James Beggs and his entourage visited
Ottawa in March 1984, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau had announced that he would leave office,
and Minister of State for Science and Technology
Donald Johnston told the U.S. delegation that a
Canadian response to the Reagan's invitation could
not be given until the elections were over, because it
was the next government that would have to make
the financial commitment to back up an acceptance
of the invitation.14y
A Progressive Conservative government headed by
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was elected in
September 1984; that government was philosophi-
cally more attuned to the Reagan administration than
had been its liberal predecessor and thus was more
likely to be positive toward accepting the U.S. offer as
a means of strengthening U.S.-Canadian relations.
Canadian astronaut Marc Garneau flew as a payload
specialist aboard an October 1984 Shuttle mission,
further reinforcing the Canadian desire to be involved
in future manned activities.
In a paper prepared for a December 1984 NASA
international workshop on the station program, Karl
Doetsch summarized the "principal issues governing
Canadian participation":
• Importance to Canada of the use of the space
station.
• Importance to Canada of the privileged access
to the infrastructure which will accrue to
participating nations.
• Desirability of maintaining and enhancing
Canada's existing area of industrial space
leadership.
• Importance of spinoff to Canadian industry in
the chosen areas of development.
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• Extent of the return on investment to be derived
from participation.
• Desirability of cooperating with other major
nations in a major international venture which
will have a profound effect on man's ability to
exploit the space environment. 19
These were clearly very different considerations
than had stimulated Europe and Japan to consider
participating in the station project.
The technical and the political arguments in
support of accepting the U.S. invitation proved ulti-
mately persuasive, but only after lengthy and intense
discussions within the Interdepartmental Committee
on Space. As one individual closely involved in both
the internal Canadian discussions and those between
the United States and Canada commented:
It was a judgment call. It was the result of endless
discussions.... There was certainly a fair amount
of unhappiness that it [the station participation] was
going to run away with all the funds.... It was a
matter of visibility. If the space station was going to
there Canada had to be part of it. This was the line
of argument that was used. And the potential
benefit to industry—that helped push it through. 110
One factor influencing at least the timing of the
Canadian decision on whether to accept the U.S.
invitation was the first summit meeting between
President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney,
scheduled for Quebec City on March 17-18, 1985.
In late January, the top Canadian space policy official,
W.M. "Mac" Evans, was optimistic that there would
be a positive decision on the part of the Canadian
cabinet by that time. 151 The U.S. Department of State
welcomed this news; it noted that it and other agen-
cies were involved in an "exercise pointing towards
achievements that can be realized before or during
the March 17-18 summit in Quebec. Canadian
cooperation on the [manned space station ► would be
such an achievement.... But we have not discussed
the possibility with the Government of Canada." The
State Department noted that "an announcement at
the summit need not necessarily be lengthy.""'
The Canadian cabinet's Committee on Economic
and Regional Development did approve a recom-
mendation for Canadian participation in the space
station on March 5; full cabinet approval followed
quickly thereafter. The approval came in the context
of an endorsement of "Canada's Interim Space Plan,
1985-1986," a document that had been prepared by
the Interdepartmental Committee on Space. This plan
noted that:
The government has decided to accept the
invitation of the United States to participate in the
Space Station Program....
Space Station will be the predominant civilian
space initiative of the remainder of the century
and will alter dramatically many of the
established ways of operating in space. Canadian
participation would permit us to maintain and
improve our competitiveness in a number of
leading-edge space technologies. All of our
international partners have decided to participate
which will offer us further opportunities to
develop new business relationships and
cooperative programs with the world's major
space nations.15'
When Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney com-
pleted their "Shamrock Summit" on March 18, their
joint communique announced that "the Prime
Minister informed the President that Canada has
accepted the U.S. invitation to participate in the
space station project."' 54
The overall Interim Space Plan was announced on
March 20. Its interim nature was very evident; it pro-
vided funding for the three potential major space pro-
jects (mobile satellite, Radarsat, and the space station)
only for the 1985-1986 period. It noted that "final
decisions" on these projects would be taken at the
end of 1985, when a long-term strategic plan for
Canadian space efforts would be issued. Future fund-
ing for the three major space projects would be deter-
mined in accordance with "strategic thrusts" set out
in the long-term plan.1 '
The development of the Canadian long-range
space plan and the assignment of priorities to the
three competing projects proved very contentious,
although Canadian involvement in the space sta-
tion would eventually gain top priority. But that
was in the future. With the March 18 announce-
ment of the Canadian decision to accept the U.S.
invitation, all three partners—Europe, Japan, and
Canada—had made the initial political commit-
ment required. Now it was up to representatives of
the prospective partners to determine whether a
framework for cooperation acceptable to all could
be developed.
Conclusion
Creating that framework eventually required three
rounds of international negotiations. One created a
set of three memoranda of understanding (MOU)
that would govern interactions between NASA and
its prospective partners during the preliminary design
phase (Phase B) of the station program, while more
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a permanent framework for those interactions
was created. This round of negotiations was com-
pleted on June 3, 1985, when NASA and ESA
signed their Phase B MOU at the Paris Air Show.
Japan and Canada had agreed to similar MOUs
earlier in the spring of 1985. These negotiations
were not particularly contentious; NASA and its
partners agreed to defer to the next negotiating
round attempts to resolve the kind of difficult
issues that had been identified in the January 31,
1985, ESA Resolution 2 on space station cooper-
ation discussed above.
The second round of space station negotiations
was highly contentious, and on several occasions
its successful outcome was in doubt. However, on
September 29, 1988, the United States, a number
of European countries, and Canada signed an
intergovernmental agreement on station coopera-
tion (Japan signed the agreement later), and NASA
signed more specific MOUs with its counterpart
space agencies in Europe, Japan, and Canada for
cooperation during the detailed design, develop-
ment, and operation and utilization phases of the
space station program.
Five years later, in December 1993, the original
space station partners decided after the end of the
Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union to
invite the Russian Federation to join the station
partnership. There followed another four years of
difficult discussions to revise the station intergov-
ernmental agreement and MOUs to accommodate
a major new partner; the new agreements were
finally signed by all partners except Japan on
January 29, 1998. (The approval processes within
Japan again were not completed in time for Japan
to sign the agreements at that time.)
This account does not cover the space station
negotiations between 1985 and 1998. It is perhaps
too soon to trace the various compromises that
were made by all parties to the discussions in order
to reach understandings to which all could agree,
and it of course is too early to make a definitive
judgment on the success of the partnership.1'
When the United States and its closest allies
began, in the early 1980s, to consider an ambitious
international partnership to design, develop, oper-
ate, and utilize a permanent space laboratory—
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The Space Station Plan, as proposed in 1986, at the time of the initial agreements for international participation.
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what has become known as the International
Space Station—they could not possibly have antic-
ipated the twists and turns in the road to making
that partnership a reality. When President Ronald
Reagan announced his approval of the space station
program in January 1984, he directed NASA to com-
plete the undertaking within a decade. It is likely to
be two decades after Reagan's announcement before
all elements of the International Space Station are in
place and ready for use. One can only hope that the
results of the partnership that began with both high
anticipation and mixed feelings, in what was a differ-
ent era in space development, justifies all the time
and effort to make it a success.
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